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ABSTRACT

The problem of primary interest in this dissertation is
the general lack of understanding among marketing scholars
concerning the role of epistemology in developing marketing
theory.

Because of this problem a primary hypothesis was

formulated that a better approach to developing marketing
theory can be produced through the study of epistemology.
A combination of primary and secondary research was used
to establish the truth or falsity of the primary hypothesis.
Each type of source was used to achieve different and sepa
rate goals.

Library or secondary research was used to

investigate the potential importance of epistemology in de
veloping marketing theory.

Primary research in the form of

a questionnaire survey was used to establish the degree of
epistemological understanding among marketing scholars.

The

results from both investigations were combined in order to
satisfy the requirements of the primary hypothesis.
The value of epistemology in developing marketing theory
and, therefore, science in marketing was determined to be a
function of the efficiency and desirability of performing
that task.

With respect to efficiency, an understanding of
xii

the problems of epistemology was determined to be a neces
sary, but not sufficient, condition for marketing to become
highly scientific.

The one common bond between all fields

of science lies in its method, not in its content.

However,

the existence of these facts does prevent some sound theory
from being formulated without knowledge of epistemological
problems.

The efficiency of epistemological understanding

was determined to be lessened, but not eliminated, by several
problems.

These problems include the unpredictability of

human behavior, the inability to conduct controlled experi
ments , the fact that the knowledge of a :theory must be con
sidered as a variable, that value-oriented bias may be
impossible to eliminate in the development of marketing
theories, and that human behavior is partially determined by
the mores of many different cultures.
Another aspect of the value which an item possesses is
its desirability.

No matter how efficient a device may be,

if the results of its use are not desired, it is of no value.
Determining the desirability of developing science in market
ing requires a value judgement by both the people involved
in marketing and the consumers.

Benefits as well as certain

undesirable occurrences accrue to both from the development
of science in marketing.

Since the field of marketing has
xiii

already set out on the path toward the development of a
science, this study contains the assumption that such a
route is deemed desirable by the concerned parties.

This

judgement may easily change as marketing progresses in its
guest.
Since an understanding of epistemology has been deter
mined to be valuable in developing science in marketing,
the results of the empirical part of this study were used to
establish the degree of understanding that exists among those
persons most likely to be formulating marketing theory.

The

results of this investigation indicated that the existing
level of understanding is less than what is desirable.

The

results also indicated that marketing scholars generally
believe that the existing body of marketing thought is not
very theoretical (mean percent theoretical = 36.1%).

These

conclusions suggest that scholarly discussions (in texts,
periodicals, etc.) about a suitable epistemology for market
ing theorists may be a major factor for developing the field
into a science.

xiv

CHAPTER X

EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN MARKETING

Introduction to the Problem
A great deal of interest has been generated of late in
the area of theory in Marketing.

The American Marketing

Association holds its annual theory seminars.

Two of the

foremost journals on marketing thought. The Journal of
Marketing and The Journal of Marketing Research, have had a
substantial number of "theory" articles over the last several
years.

Also, the increasing importance of marketing science

has added impetus to the drive for developing marketing
theory.
The movement to develop theory in marketing has been
less than well organized.

Several approaches to marketing

theory were reviewed by S c h w a r t z . H i s conclusions were
that none of these approaches yielded empirically valid
marketing theory.

What is especially interesting in

^George Schwartz, Development of Marketing Theory,
South-Western Publishing Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, 1963, 152 pp.
^The approaches considered by Schwartz included those
of Reilly and Converse (pp. 9-34) , Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (pp. 55-67), Grether (pp. 68-86) , McGarry
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studying these attempts at developing theory is the lack of
a succinct approach.
When the attempts at formulating theory in marketing
are compared with attempts at theory formulation in the
physical sciences or well developed social sciences, one
finds that those areas with well established theory have a
concise, generally accepted view of how to formulate it.
Typically, no single viewpoint has been accepted even in
these areas.

The minority opposition in the well establish

ed areas state their objection(s) and offer the rules that
they intend to follow in developing theory.

Their alterna

tives are generally clear and well formulated.^
The purpose of this dissertation is to show the impor
tance of developing a common starting point from which to
build marketing theory.
epistemology.

It is now appropriate to define

Epistemology is the starting point.

It is

the theory or science of the method and grounds of knowledge.

(pp. 87-100), Alderson (pp. 101-114), Cox and Goodman (pp.
115-121), and Breyer (pp. 121-125).
The area of economic theory provides a good, current
example. The mainstream of thought in economic theory is
occupied by a group labeled as positive economists. This
group includes Samuelson, Friedman, and the large majority
of living economists. A small minority of economists take
another viewpoint on theory development. This group has been
labeled as Extreme A Priorists, and it includes Von Mises,
Knight, Robbins, and others. Their exceptions and view
points are well developed in the literature.

A central theme of dissertation is that if a common episte
mology is largely accepted by marketing scholars, a better
approach to theory in marketing can be developed.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS

The problem of primary interest in this dissertation
is the general lack of understanding among marketing scholars
concerning the role of epistemology in developing marketing
theory.
is:

The hypothesis upon which this study has been based

It can be shown that a better approach to developing

marketing theory can be produced through study of the method
and grounds of knowledge (epistemology).

Incorporated in

this hypothesis are the following three sub-hypotheses.
1.

It can be shown that one criterion for judging
a better approach to develop marketing theories
is the degree to which marketing theorists under
stand the problems of epistemology.

2.

It can be illustrated that, if marketing is to
become highly scientific, marketing scholars
must develop the requirements for an accepted
epistemology.

3.

It can also be shown that unsettled differences
among authorities on epistemology adversely
affects the ability of marketing theorists to

4
develop the field into a science.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study was purposely limited to epistemological
problems in marketing.

Because of its keynote importance

and the involved character of the topic, epistemology has
been isolated from other important areas for the purpose
of this study.

If epistemology is the starting point in

developing good marketing theory, then logic is the path
to that goal.

A discussion of logic has. been omitted ex

cept as it has a supportive role in developing an investi
gation on epistemology.
parts of methodology.

Logic and epistemology are the two
The purpose of the omission of logic

from the discussion in this paper is to center attention on
the complex problems of epistemology.

The .area of problems in

logic as it applies to developing marketing theory is suit
able for further study.
The population used in the mail survey section of this
study consisted of academic members of the American Marketing
Association.

This population was assumed to be important in

the future development of marketing theory.

Persons, other

than college and university professors who are members of the
American Marketing Association, have contributed to marketing

theory.

However, the group selected as the population is

expected to be the major contributors.

The greater the

attempt to make marketing a science, the more this expecta
tion appears to be true.

The above beliefs are the reason

for centering attention on the population chosen for this
study.
All of the inherent limitations that exist in mail
surveys were also a part of this study.

However, a mail

survey was the only realistic approach to sufficiently sample
the population.

One possible speculation about the sample

is that those people most interested in marketing theory have
tended to return the questionnaire while those people less
interested have not.

No attempt to measure the existence or

extent of this bias was made.

The special problems encoun

tered with the questionnaire used for this study have been
discussed in Chapter V, the initial chapter of primary re
search .
One other major limitation of the study deals with the
scholarly state of epistemology.

Sub-hypothesis three in

dicates that philosophers and other people interested in
epistemology are far from agreement on the proper approach.

4

4See for example: John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic,
Longmans, Green and Company, Ltd., London, England, 1961, 622
pp.; Ludwig Von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics,

The unsettled state of this area has been discussed in the
third and fourth chapters of this paper.

DEFINITIONS OF TERMINOLOGY

The following definitions are the ones used throughout
the paper.
curred.

Specific deviations have been noted as they oc

Certain definitions that follow may be different

from particular individual understandings of them.

An at

tempt has been made to keep such deviations as small as
possible.

Methodology
Methodology has been classified as one of the three
provinces of Philosophy.

The other two areas of Philosophy

have been labeled Metaphysics and Theory of Value.
ever, there is a large diversity of opinion.

How

Those authors

that bother to classify Philosophy into branches differ in
determining how it should be split.

Aesthetics and Ethics,

D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1960,
239 pp.; and Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science,
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York, New York, 1961,
618 pp.
5
These labels were selected from among many different
possibilities. They are the ones used by; Brand Blanshard,
"Philosophy," Collier *s Encyclopedia, Crowell Collier and
Macmillan, Inc., New York, New York, 1966, Volume 18,
pp. 702-703.

grouped under Theory of Value, are often considered separate
ly.
The study of methodology covers the nature of knowledge.
Those interested in methodology are less interested in the
facts than how they were obtained.

This area of study conC

sists of two parts called epistemology and logic.
Epistemology;

This term deals with the basic methods

used to attain knowledge a n d .the grounds for that knowledge.
The proper source of knowledge and the concomitant question
concerning the criteria for truth are important to those
interested in epistemology.

For example, the observation of

facts is one source of knowledge.

A philosopher interested

in methodology and particularly in epistemology might ask if
observation of facts is a proper source of knowledge, and
whether such observed facts are a proper criteria for truth.
The philosopher might object to this method of attaining
knowledge on the basis of a difference between precepts and
things.

This difference exists whether the perceiver is a

man or a machine.

The person interested in epistemology may

deal with this problem of observation in his search for an

6The problem of classification also occurs with the
usage of the term methodology. Many authors refer to method
ology as a sub-classification of Logic. In such context,
its meaning is considerably narrowed relative to the usage
intended above.

acceptable source of knowledge and criteria for truth.
Logic;

The other branch of methodology is logic.

Logic is broadly defined as a study of valid forms of
reasoning.

Epistemology provides the starting point for

scientific explanation by establishing rules for attaining
facts or ultimate truths.

These are the primary building

blocks to be used in explaining a phenomenon.

Logic des

cribes how these blocks may be properly put together in
order to accomplish the explanation.

Science and Scientific Explanation
A broad, but generally acceptable, definition of a
science has been used in this dissertation.

Science has been

defined as "a connected and systematized body of truths
possessing generality in form."

This definition was the

one used throughout the following discourse.

Truth without

generality is not a science, and neither can detached and
disconnected generalized truths be considered a science.
The role of a scientist consist of explanation of exist
ing phenomena and prediction of potential future phenomena.
Both of these are achieved through understanding of the

7
John Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political
Economy, fourth edition, Kelley & Millman, Inc., New York,
New York, 1955, p. 150.

circumstances surrounding a particular phenomenon.

Like

wise, understanding is achieved in a science through the
proper use of methodology.

It is possible to separate

scientific explanation into two components called explanans
and explananda.8
Explanans;

The explanans provide the primary informa

tion and restrictions necessary to an explanation.

Included

in this definition are statements of antecedent conditions
and existing laws or truths or facts needed to achieve ex
planation .
Explanandum:

The explananaum is the phenomenon to be

explained or predicted.
explanans.

It is logically derived from the

Schematically, the process of scientific explana

tion may be represented as follows:

(LOGIC)
EXPLANANS - ■ ■

EXPLANANDUM

Theory
A theory is an attempt at scientific explanation and
may be identified by data contained in the explanans.

If

ft

The terminology used here is the same as that used by
Hempel and Oppenheim but broader meanings are intended. See
Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, ”Studies in the Logic of
Explanation," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1948),
pp. 135-175.
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the facts contained in the explanans are not known to be
true, the explanandum that results is a theory.9
occur in many different ways.

This can

Some of the possible elements

in the explanans that cause the result to be a theory are
the addition of an untested hypothesis, the addition of nonprovable assumptions, and the replacement of general laws
with other theories.

The theory is still an attempt to ex

plain or predict a phenomenon.

While it may gain the

stature of general law through a large amount of testing in
the real world, a theory can never be completely proven by
that method.
The explanans of a theory may also contain another sub
group of statements that identifies nothing recognizable in
real world experiences.

These statements often use the

limiting case of some observable process.

Examples of this

group are "vacuum" in physics, "perfect competition" in

Q

Often definitions of theory are not nearly so laborious.
A good example occurs in the following quotation by: George
Schwartz, Science in Marketing, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New
York, New York, 1965, p. 7. "A theory can consist of a few
or many verbal statements and/or numerical statements which
describe the behavior of some marketing phenomenon by refer
ence to other marketing phenomena. The purpose of a theory
is to enable one to predict the behavior of this dependent
phenomenon." The passage is an example of the use of theory
in its loosest form. The goal is the same as in the above
text, but it severely lacks structure in trying to attain
results. The addition of structure to attempts at marketing
theory is a major goal of this study.

11
economic theory, "gene" in biological theory, and "infinity"
in mathematics.

The inclusion in an explanan of such state

ments is bound to have a limiting effect on the derived
explanandum.

While the limiting effect of this abstraction

from reality is important to remember, it can also be a
valuable aid in removing nuisance parameters from highly
complex phenomena.

Removing these parameters may permit

those interested to concentrate on the truly important
factors affecting a phenomenon.

Normative Science
The application of scientific principles to achieve
ethical and moral ends is the essence of a normative science.
It requires that the system of values to be applied be known
and concrete in nature.

Moral and ethical values differ

between individuals, and if a system of values is not con
crete, different interpretations may arise.
A normative science deals with the criteria of "what
ought to be."10

The goal of a normative science is the

establishment of ideals.

Ethics is an example of a normative

^Keynes, op. cit., p. 34.
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science of special interest to philosophers, and welfare
economics is an example of special interest to economists.
Both are interested in the proper way (value judgment) to
accomplish something.
Since a normative science deals with such variable in
tangibles as morals and ethical values there may be some
question as to why it has been labeled a science.

But it

must be remembered that a normative science uses all of the
techniques of science in connection with the value judgments.
In the world as it exists, a scientist (and especially a
social scientist) must operate within a system of values if
he is to operate at all.

Positive Science
In contrast to a normative science, a positive science
is concerned only with things as they exist,-independent of
any particular ethical position or normative judgment.

It

is the definition of a positive science that is usually
given under the label of "science."

The search for explana

tion and prediction, for cause and effect, and for uniformi
ties in nature are all similar and acceptable ways of
describing the goal of a positive science.
primary tools of a positive science.

Facts are the

13

RESEARCH DESIGN

A combination of primary and secondary information was
used in this study with the purpose of establishing the
truth of falsity of the primary hypotheses {see p. 3 ) •
Each source of information was used to achieve different and
separate goals.

When these goals have been attained, com

bined, and then analyzed, the degree of truth or falsity of
the primary hypothesis has been determined.

Library or Secondary Research
The goal of research by this method was to illustrate
the importance of epistemology in developing marketing theory.
This goal could not have been achieved by strict reliance on
marketing literature.

In fact, very little has been written

in marketing on epistemology.

Moreover, most of the market

ing literature on methodology gives but a superficial cover
age to the scientific method.

The only recourse left to

perform this study is to seek information outside of the
marketing literature.

In doing so, an attempt has been made

to draw from areas closely related to marketing*1 or from
Philosophy, the original source of scholarly discourse on
epistemology.

^Especially Economics.

14
Existing literature on epistemology discusses its role
in theory development.

Since epistemology and theory have

been defined as being separate from any given field of
study-^, it is legitimate to apply the rules governing them
to marketing.

Then, it is also possible to extend the

benefits and problems connected with epistemology into the
area of marketing.

The above stated goal of library research

has been achieved if the study shows that epistemology is
valuable in theory development.
Another purpose of secondary research also sheds light
on the impact of the primary hypothesis.

Sub-hypothesis

three (p. 3) declares that the state of epistemology in most
areas is somewhat unsettled.

This unsettled nature of the

area is the result of classical arguments that are not likely
to be easily resolved.

Secondary research efforts have sug

gested how the arguments are going to effect application of
epistemology to marketing.

Primary Research
The goal of the empirical investigation was to determine
the familiarity of marketing scholars with epistemology.

12

See pp. 7-9.
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This research took the form of a questionnaire survey mailed
to a sample of the academic American Marketing Association
members.
Population Selection:

The population selected was used

because of its reasonably close match with a population de
veloped as an ideal.

If an ideal population existed, it

would contain all of those persons that shall be formulating
or teaching marketing theory in the near future.

In order

for a member of this ideal group to be prepared for formu
lating or teaching marketing theory in the near future, he
is reasonably expected to understand the intricate and com
plex process of marketing,

a

member of this ideal group is

also expected to be familiar with existing marketing theory
and to be at least somewhat familiar with attempts at theory
formulation in areas outside of marketing.
The members of such an ideal population cannot be iso
lated.

The ideal population can only be estimated by ap

proximating the characteristics of its members.

One

ready-made group whose characteristics do approximate those
of the ideal group is the academic members of the American
Marketing Association.

This group is for the most part both

familiar and interested in the process of marketing.

It is

also reasonable to expect that this group is fairly familiar
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with marketing theory and theory in other areas.

Certainly

non-academic marketing people and non-members of the Ameri
can Marketing Association have contributed significantly to
marketing theory and are expected to again.

But in order to

narrow the population to a workable size, and to isolate as
much as possible the group with the most influence on
marketing theory, only academic American Marketing Associ
ation members were used.
Sample Size;

The following terminology has been used

in the discussion on sample size.
Np
Ng
n
Xg
x
z
P
p
Sp

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

population-*-3
= 1116
overall number of questionnaires sent
= 400
small sample of questionnaires sent
=
40
total questionnaires returned
= 124
small sample returns
=
13
standard normal deviate
population proportion
sample proportion
estimated standard error of the proportion

The determination of representative sample was compli
cated by several factors.
of the questionnaire.

One problem was the unusual nature

It was easy to speculate that a ques

tionnaire which tested the sample, rather than just asked
for opinions from the sample, would not be returned to any
significant degree.

4

^

JSee: Membership Roster of the American Marketing
Association, Chicago: American Marketing Association,
January 1, 1967, pp. 188-192.
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In order to estimate expected return, a small pre-test
sample (n) was selected.

The selection was made randomly

from the total population (Np ) .

its size (n = 40) was

primarily limited by costs incurred related to possible
benefits derived.

The expected return sought is the per

centage return which would occur if questionnaires were sent
to the entire population (P).

It was expected that some

larger mailing, less than the size of the population, was
also expected to experience a similar return (P) if it were
selected at random from the population (N ).

The pre-test

tr

yielded a 32.5% return (p =

= °*325 « 32.5%).

In

order to make predictions about the population from this
sample, it has been assumed that the sample proportions are
normally distributed.

This assumption is approximately true

because of the statistical phenomenon commonly known as the
"Centeral Limit T h e o r m . " ^

of course, the best estimate of

14The equation representing some level of confidence
about the value of the percentage return from the population
(P) i s :
P & p - zsp
(for small samples)
— / (.325) (.~675)
V
40-1

V.00513
=

0.072
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percentage return of the population (P) is the sample
return ( p = 32.5%).

The estimates of population return

seemed adequate enough to continue with a larger sample.
The next problem to be analyzed was the relation of
actual responses on an individual question to hypothetical
responses by the entire population on that question.

That

is, to what extent can the results of the sample be applied
to the entire population?

The validity of this kind of

extrapolation can be calculated if two assumptions are
granted.

These assumptions are questionable, however.

The

first assumption deals with the sampling of human beings
in general.

Sampling techniques and statistical inference

are typically built around stable populations with

At 90.0% confidence, z = 1.28 (one tail test) and,
p

^

p _ ZSp

P > 0.325 - (1.28)(0.072)
Pi

0.325 - 0.092

Pi

0.213 or 21.3%

At 70.0% confidence, z = 0.53 (one tail test) and,
P i p -

zsp

P i 0.325 - (0.53) (0.072)
P i 0.325 - 0.038
Pi

0.287 or 28.7%
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discernible and measurable traits.
neither of these characteristics.

Human beings exhibit
A more serious problem

occurs because of the non-respondents.

Statements of con

fidence about population characteristics extrapolated from
a sample requires that the sample be random.

If non

respondents differ in some important way from those that do
respond, then even a totally random mail-out yields a biased
15
non-random return. ^
The first of the above objections can be satisfied by
limiting the results of the study to the time at which the
questionnaires were returned and by assuming that academic
people, not asked to divulge their name, had filled out the
questionnaire as honestly as possible.

The second of the

above objections is not nearly as easily handled.

It is

quite probable that bias does exist due to the attitudes of
non-respondents.

While it is statistically possible to

quiz the non-respondents in order to determine the extent
of this bias,

16

it is not economically feasible.

The

15

Morris H. Hanson, William N. Hurwitz, and William G.
Madow, Sample Survey Methods and Theory, Volume I, New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1953, pp. 69-71.
•^One method for dealing with non-respondents is double
sampling. See for example: Hanson, 0 £. cit., pp. 473-475.
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problem can be attacked another way, however.

It requires

reasoning into the type of person that would respond and
the type of person that would not respond.

The author

postulates that there was a greater tendency for those
people with some background in methodology to return the
questionnaire due to their greater interest and understand
ing.

If that is so, then the results of the study signify

a greater understanding of methodology and epistemology
than actually exists in the population.

If in spite of

this, problems of understanding in the area have been dis
covered, then useful conclusions can be drawn.

If the re

sults indicate a high degree of knowledge in the area, they
are less useful because of the bias.17

17

The following calculations represent what the results
would indicate if the returns were a truly random sample. In
making these calculations, the universe of all similar sized
samples is assumed to be normally distributed.
The power of
the centeral limit theorm makes this assumption approximately
true.
s

P
p

=

the percentage of responses giving one
specific answer to any given question

q

=

(1.00 - p)

The values p and q will vary from response to response and
from question to question.
In order to generalize Sp, the
product p times q has been given its maximum value in the
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If there were not the problem with randomness, the
results of the sample were quite adequate for predicting
the responses of the population.

A seven or eight percent

difference is not serious in seeking the kind of information
desired from this study (i.e., information from which broad
generalizations can be drawn).

The sample Xs represents a

31.0% response to the overall number of questionnaires sent
(Ng = 400; percent return = 100 times xs
Ns

).

following calculations. Thu3, sp and the confidence limits
calculated using sp will probably be somewhat larger than
necessary. The difference should not be excessive, es
pecially when considered in the light of the two major prob
lems discussed above.
sr

= /CO.25)(1116 - 124)
(124)(115)

V

= 7(0725) (992)
Y (124)(115)

~

= -/0.001797_
=

0.0424

The range for the population proportion (P):
with 95% confidence (z - 1.96 for two tail test) is
P ± zsp
P ± (1.96)(0.0424)
p * 0.0831 or p i

8.31%

with 90% confidence (z = 1.65 for two tail test) is
p ± (1.65)(0.0424)
p ± 0.0700 or p 4 7.00%

Preparation of Questionnaire:

The final state of the

questionnaire was for the most part that of multiple choice
q u e s t i o n s . O n e of the prime reasons for using this ap
proach was the ease with which respondents could answer the
questions.

The difficulty of the questions made the simpli

city of form especially important.

Another reason for using

this approach was the minimal interpretation of responses
for categorization that was required.
The quality of the questions was pre-tested formally
twice.

The first pre-test occurred at what turned out to

be an intermediate stage of development for the question
naire.

It was conducted among doctoral graduate students

in marketing at Louisiana State University.

Valuable in

formation for further development was obtained.

The

second formal pre-test occurred when forty questionnaires
were sent to members of the population (n).

These responses

led to a minor change in the wording of one question and the
format of possible answers for that same question.

See Appendix A.
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REPORT PREVIEW

The body o£ this paper was constructed in two basic
parts.

Part one includes Chapters II through IV.

An

intermediate summary of conclusions has been included as
the last section of Chapter IV so that the goal of the
first part was properly emphasized.

The purpose of the

first part was to establish the importance of epistemology
in developing a science and the need for marketing scholars
to understand epistemological problems.

This first part

has attempted to satisfy sub-hypotheses one and three.
The role and importance of epistemology in marketing
were analyzed in Chapter II.

The importance or value of

epistemology was determined to be the efficiency it ex
hibited in aiding the development of science in marketing
and the desirability of establishing science in marketing.
The efficiency of epistemology was determined to be rep
resented by the effectiveness of the role it plays and its
ability to aid in overcoming the special problems of de
veloping science in marketing.

The desirability of develop

ing science in marketing is a value-oriented judgment that
must be made, either overtly or covertly, to determine the
value of epistemology.
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Chapter III was used to examine the two sources of
knowledge.

Each source was defined, and the basis for its

existence was analyzed.

Characteristics about the sources

and their role in developing theory were examined.

In

Chapter IV, problems connected with the two sources were
analyzed.

Each source was found to be less than fully ac

cepted as a criterion for truth.

Conclusions for the

marketing theorist were developed in the chapter.

The last

section was devoted to summarizing the conclusions of the
first part of the study.
The second part of this study dealt with the primary
research conducted in order to fully satisfy sub-hypotheses
one and two.

It included Chapters V and VI.

Chapter V was

presented to examine the personal background of the res
pondents.

Data which appeared related to characteristics

of the ideal population were given special emphasis.

The

analysis of the respondents' answers to the questions on
methodology was the primary purpose of Chapter VI.

The re

sults of each question were individually analyzed, and
certain cross-classifications were given when deemed
significant.
Chapter VII is the conclusions and recommendations
chapter.

Included in the chapter are a restatement of the

25
hypothesis, a summary of conclusions, and recommendations
for improving marketing theory.

CHAPTER II

THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF EPISTEMOLOGY IN MARKETING

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the value
of epistemology to marketing.

The importance or value of

epistemology to marketing lies in the aid it is capable of
providing to the development of science in marketing.

Ac

complishment of this chapter's purpose is of major impor
tance to the primary hypothesis.

The primary hypothesis

of this investigation states that a better approach to
developing marketing theory can be produced through study
of the method and grounds of knowledge (epistemology).*
Theory is at the conceptual heart of science.

Aiding the

development of science automatically aids the development
of the component of science in marketing which is theory.

^See Chapter I, p. 7.
Theory is defined in Chapter I (p. 9) as "an attempt
at scientific explanation,” and explanation is the major
goal of science. Theory then is a tool by which science
attempts to achieve its goal. The Chapter I definition is
broad enough to include the various degrees of theory ac
ceptance known as hypotheses, principles, and laws.
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The value or importance of epistemology to the develop
ment of science in marketing is a function of at least two
variables, namely:

(1) the efficiency of epistemology in

developing science and (2) the desirability of science in
marketing.

The efficiency of epistemology is defined as

how well it can perform the task of aiding the development
of theory and science.
Efficiency is dealt with in the following section
which contains a discussion of the effectiveness of episte
mology and of the major problems of developing science in
marketing.

The desirability of making marketing a science

is the topic of the second section.

The benefits and prob

lems connected with science in marketing are discussed, and
then the existing trend toward the development of science
in marketing is outlined.

EFFICIENCY OF EPISTEMOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING SCIENCE
IN MARKETING

The task of this section is to determine the efficiency
of epistemology in the development of science in marketing.
To accomplish the task, the direct effectiveness of episte
mology in science development is established.

Next, the

special problems connected with developing science in
marketing are illustrated.

The effectiveness of epistemology
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for developing science in marketing is directly related to
the outcome of these two discussions.

Effectiveness of Epistemology in Developing
Science
The effectiveness of epistemology in developing science
is dealt with in the following two sub-sections.

Episte

mology is neither a panacea or something to be overlooked
when developing a science.
Epistemology and Nonsuccess in Science Development:

A

relationship of primary importance occurs between epistemolo
gy and methodology.

This relationship is definitional, and

general discussions on methodology also include implications
for epistemology.

3

Many of the following comments are about

methodology rather than epistemology, but their 4-ropact on
epistemology is similar to that on the broader category.
Because of the strong bonds between methodology and
science, some scholars have incorrectly equated success in
the former with success in the latter.4

However, scientific

methodology is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for a successful scientific endeavor.

Max Weber has stated

3See Chapter I, p. 7.
4See "The Myth of Methodology" in: Abraham Kaplan,
The Conduct of Inquiry, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing
Company, 1964, pp. 24-27.
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his views on the subject in the following manner;
(The study of methodology) can only bring us re
flective understanding of the means which have
demonstrated their value in practice by raising
them to the level of explicit consciousness; it
is no more than a precondition of fruitful intel
lectual work than the knowledge of anatomy is the
precondition for correct walking.5
Nevertheless, explicit consciousness about anatomy can aid
posture in walking.

Similarly, explicit knowledge about

methodology, and particularly epistemology, can be a signifi
cant aid to successful scientific endeavor.

Kaplan states,

t

"I believe that the most important contribution methodology
can make to science is, in Peirce's phrase, to help unblock
the roads of inquiry."6
Epistemology as an Aid in Developing a Science;

What

then is the particular relationship between methodology and
science?

Methodology is the one unifying element common

to all branches of science.
The field of science is unlimited:
its material is
endless, every group of natural phenomena, every
phase of social life, every stage of past or present
development is material for science. The unity of
all science consists alone in its method, not in
its materia lT?

^Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences,
Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949, p. 115.
6Kaplan, C£. cit., p. 24.
^Karl Pearson, The Grammer of Science, third edition,
London; Adam and Charles Black, 1911, p. 12.

30
This unification occurs through the universal application
of a broadly defined method of science.
The universally accepted method of science is dependent upon a sound epistemology.

O

Specifically, episte

mology is defined as dealing with the means used to attain
knowledge and the grounds for that knowledge.

Scholarly

efforts in epistemology are directed in search for the
nature and criterion of truth.

But science was briefly de

fined as a body of truths, and scientists have devoted
their efforts to discovering truths or developing theories
about truths,

A sound epistemology can then be a valuable

guide to scientists.

It can provide a sounding board where

scientists may test their theories for validity.
As an example of the role of epistemology in science,
suppose that the only accepted source of knowledge by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (N.A.S.A.)
is observation.
space travel.

N.A.S.A. desires to develop a science of
A theory about the affects of space flight

on the mental capabilities of astronauts is developed.

For

this theory to become part of the "science" of space travel,
it must be tested and the results observed under conditions

8Note the definition of methodology and epistemology
in Chapter I, pp. 6-7.
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of space flight.

The truth of the theory is not accepted

until the epistemological requirement of observation is
met.

Until the truth of the theory is accepted, it can not

be added to that "body of truths" which is defined as
science.®

In summary, while individual scientific successes

may be achieved without the development of a sound episte
mology, establishing a field as a highly scientific area may
require that a valid epistemology exists.

A valid episte

mology then becomes a necessary but not sufficient condition
for success.

Problems with Development of Science in Marketing
The second aspect of determining the efficiency that
epistemology exhibits in developing science in marketing is
discussed in this section.

The aspect of efficiency investi

gated here is the specific problems that tend to inhibit
science development in marketing.

These problems are

special barriers to the smooth performance of epistemology
suggested in the preceding section.
In a 1951 article, Robert Bartels stated that "Interest
in the development of a broader science of marketing is in
part the result of the appearance of marketing problems which

^Definition of science, Chapter I, p. 8.
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the present body of knowledge is incapable of

s o l v i n g . " ^

The problems still exist and are becoming more acute.

The

problems faced by marketing are typically the same ones
faced by all of the social sciences.

Some of these problems

apply more accutely to marketing than to other areas, and
an attempt was made to isolate those problems for discussion
in this section.
Predictability of Human Behavior;

A primary problem

faced by marketing scientists probes into the nature of
mgin's decision-making process.

This process determines

man's actions and reactions, and the explanation of human
action is a major goal of marketing science.

The unpre

dictability of man's decision-making process causes prob
lems in developing a science about human action.

The

development of a science requires that its interacting ele
ments do not occur at random.

Adherence to one approach

for scientific development requires that the object of that
development be somewhat mechanistic in nature.

If the ob

ject is totally mechanistic, then cause and effect can be
established, facts or truths can be determined, and

10Robert Bartels, "Can Marketing be a Science," Jour
nal of Marketing, XV (January, 1951), 326.

explanation is possible.

If the object is totally unmech-

anistic (actions occur freely and randomly), cause and
effect and explanation are meaningless.

Using purely a

priori knowledge, man's process of decision-making can be
placed somewhere between totally mechanistic and totally
unmechanistic.

Then to the extent that man's process of

decision-making is other than mechanistic, totally reli
able scientific explanation can not be achieved.

Con

versely, to the extent that man's process of decision-making
is mechanistic, this problem is no barrier to scientific
explanation in marketing.
The solution to this problem lies in the approach to
science in marketing, not in its object —

man.

The

solution is not likely to be completely satisfactory to
marketing scientists.

If the a priori statement on classi

fication of the human decision-making process is correct,
then it is improbable that science in marketing will ever
achieve the level of efficiency that exists in the physical
sciences.

Statements of explanation or prediction in the

physical sciences are given high probabilities, but the
degree of randomness in human behavior places a much lower
ceiling on the probability of particular occurrences in
marketing.

Their lower probability of occurrence is an

annoyance, but it does not render such statements useless
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any more than the relatively low probability of a weather
forecast renders it useless.

As in the weather forecast,

statements on human action with lower probabilities than
desirable can still be the basis for decision-making and
planning.

They are eminently better than other alterna

tives .
Controlled Inquiry in Marketing:

This section is used

to investigate whether the inability of marketing to con
duct controlled experiments has a serious effect on its
capability of becoming a science.'*'^

precisely controlled

experiments like those in physics and chemistry do not
occur in marketing.

One reason for the nonoccurrence is

that marketing men do not usually possess the power to
change social situations in order to satisfy the require
ments of such an experiment.

For example, Nagel points

out that:
In a controlled experiment, the experimenter can
manipulate at will, even if only within limits,
certain features in a situation (often designated
as "variables" or "factors") which are assumed to
constitute the relevant condition for the occur
rence of the phenomena under study. . . .-*-2

13-Many of the ideas for the remaining discourse on
"Problems with Development of Science in Marketing" come
from: Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961, pp. 450-459.
^ I b i d . , pp. 450-451.
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This manipulation is often not possible when the object of
an experiment is a human.
Even if the power to manipulate humans prevailed, two
other problems connected with controlled experimentation in
marketing exist.

First, in an experiment using knowledge

able beings as subjects, that experiment becomes a social
variable.

If a subject knows that he is participating in

an experiment, he may alter his normal behavior.
experiment repetition may be impossible.

Second,

Irreversible

modification in the social milieu may be caused by the
introduction of experimental change and the ensuing results
of that change.

The inability to produce repeated modifi

cations in a social experiment severely limits the value of
experimentation in marketing.
In the face of these problems certain saving facts
exist.

Controlled experimentation is not a "sine qua non"

for establishing comprehensive systems of explanation in
marketing.

Several existing sciences are not experimental.

This group includes astronomy, astrophysics, and geology.
Also, something akin to a controlled experiment often
occurs naturally.

It is the job of the investigator to

isolate these instances of contrasting inputs and record
the resultant outputs.
trolled experiment.

The results approach those of a con

However, Nagel differentiates this

approach from controlled experimentation by labeling it
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controlled i n v e s t i g a t i o n . N a g e l ' s controlled investiga
tion is an extension of what is commonly known as ex post
facto research but is broader in scope.

Kerlinger defines

ex post facto research as follows:
Ex post facto research may be defined as that re
search in which the independent variable or vari
ables have already occurred and in which the
researcher starts with the observation of a de
pendent variable or variables. He then studies
the independent variables in retrospect for their
possible relations to, and effects on, the de
pendent variable or v a r i a b l e s .
Nagel's controlled investigation involves the comparison of
several ex post facto investigations.
One other point is important to the cited problems of
controlled experimentation in marketing.
use experimentation.
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Marketing does

While the experiments are not con

trollable in the same sense that physical science experi
ments may be, they significantly offset the problems cited
in this section.

Boyd and Westfall center their discussion

13Ibid., pp. 452-453.
14

Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research,
New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, p. 360.
15

Several marketing research texts discuss experimenta
tion in marketing. The following two are cited for their
exceptional handling of the topic: Harper W. Boyd and
Ralph Westfall, Marketing Research, Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1956, pp. 79-113; Seymour Banks, Experi
mentation in Marketing, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, 275 pp.

of experiments in marketing around six types.

They label

them the Before-After Design, the Before-After with Control
Group Design, the Four-Group —

Six Study Design, the After

Only with Control Group Design, the Ex Post Facto Design
(discussed above), and the Panel Design.

The use of con

trol groups is prominent in the various designs.

They are

used to help eliminate the effect of irreversible modifica
tion of the social milieu.

Also, the use of control groups

can reduce the effect of the experiment as a social variable.
The problems connected with controlled experimentation
in marketing reduce the probability that this area can be
come as scientific as the physical sciences.

However, these

problems have not eliminated marketing as a potential science.
They have only added to the challenge.
Knowledge of Theory in Marketing as a Variable;

Once

theories in marketing become known among the people affected
by them, those theories become variables.

The knowledge of

a theory in marketing influences the very behavior that the
theory attempts to predict.

People react according to the

behavior predicted by the theory.

The result of the reaction

may be to completely invalidate the conclusions of highly
competent inquiry.

Two well known types of social predic

tions (theories) can be distinguished.

They are "the suici

dal prediction" and "the self-fulfilling prophecy."

Both
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illustrate what knowledge of a prediction can do to compe
tently established theory.
Once a suicidal prediction is known, that very know
ledge prohibits the fulfillment of the prediction.

The

following example is used to illustrate the operation of
suicidal predictions.

In a hypothetical situation, a

teacher predicts that a student will not graduate because
of a lack of ability.

This prediction is based on compe

tent observation of the student and from existing I.Q.
scores.

Upon learning of the teacher's prediction, the

student compensates for his deficiencies in ability with
enough hard work to graduate.

If this occurs, the teacher's

prediction was suicidal because the knowledge of that pre
diction caused its failure.
The second type of social prediction or theory that can
invalidate competent prior conclusions is called the selffulfilling prophecy.

In this instance, the results of any

initially valid inquiries are not known or at least not
accepted.

Rather, the self-fulfilling prophecy usually

starts with initially unsound predictions.

If the unin

formed prediction is then accepted by the proper people,
the prediction is fulfilled.

As an illustration of the

self-fulfilling prophecy, the hypothetical student-teacher
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situation can again be used.

Suppose that an uninformed

teacher predicts that a competent student does not have the
ability to graduate.

Upon learning of the prediction the

student becomes despondent, gives up, and fails out of
school.

The teacher's prophecy was self-fulfilling because

the knowledge of that prophecy caused its fulfillment.
Another often used example of this phenomenon occurs when a
"run" is experienced by a financially sound bank.

In this

instance, the prophecy is usually that the bank will fail
for financial reasons even though it actually is sound by
banking standards.

Upon hearing the prediction, depositors

attempt to withdraw their funds all at once.

Even sound

banks can not provide large quantities of liquidity in the
short time interval involved.

The prophecy is then proved

true because the bank is forced into bankruptcy.
The impact of prior theory knowledge on the development
of science in marketing can be offset.

The compensating

factor lies in the nature of theory statements.

Operational

statements of marketing theory are typically conditional,
and conditional statements can be formulated to include the
effect of knowledge.

The conditional statement makes

marketing theory generally less powerful, harder to under
stand, and can eliminate it from practical usage.

The
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problem is one of degree and is not likely to stop the
development of science in marketing.

The existence of this

problem has only created additional difficulties for de
veloping that science.
Value-Oriented Bias in Marketing:

The comments in this

study are based on the premise that a positive rather than
normative approach to marketing is possible.

A positive

science deals with facts while a normative science must
satisfy value-oriented problems.

This section deals with

the question of whether value-oriented bias can be eliminat
ed from inquiries in marketing.
The argument exists that fact and value in the social
sciences are impossible to separate.^

The proponents of

the argument feel that value judgments must enter into all
human statements.

Even apparent statements of fact or

descriptive statements include elements of value-oriented
bias according to these proponents.

The reasons given for

the viewpoint center strictly around the nature of human
behavior.

The source of knowledge about value-oriented bias

appears to be observation on the part of those persons that

16See for an example: Leo Strauss, "The Social Science
of Max Weber," Measure, II (1951), 211-214.

believe fact and value can not be separated.

If their

argument is true, then marketing can not be a completely
positive science because all scientific statements in
marketing have elements of value-oriented bias.
The question has been argued pro and con, but neither
side was satisfactorily proven true.1^

One approach to

solving the dilemma may be for scientists in marketing to
be as positive as possible in their approach.

To the ex

tent that value-oriented bias still exists, marketing is
shifted from a positive toward a normative science.

The

end effect may not be a serious barrier to the development
of science in marketing.

Many of the appraising value

judgments that social scientists are accused of commiting
are also common to the physical sciences.18

The effect

has not prevented the physical sciences from developing to
any significant degree.

17

A stimulating exchange on the subject as it pertains
to the philosophy of Law occurred in the following articles
Lon Fuller, "Human Purpose and Natural Law," Natural Law
Forum, III (1958), 68-76; Ernest Nagel, "On the Fusion of
Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller," oj>. cit., pp.
77-82; Lon Fuller, "A Rejoiner to Professor Nagel," o p .
cit., pp. 83-104; also see Ernest Nagel, "Fact, Value, and
Human Purpose," Natural Law Forum, IV (1959), 26-43.
IQ

See the discussion by: Ernest Nagel, The Structure
of Science, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961, p.
494.
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Cultural Relativity:

Both national and international

cultures have a significant effect on the environment of
marketing.

Social behavior is apparently a function of

culturally instituted impulses as well as the stimulus of
the immediate situation.

Culturally determined differences

among people seems to limit the possibility of generaliza
tion on human behavior.

Moreover, individual cultures are'

extremely difficult to isolate as they often include large
gray areas.

Even more specifically, the effect of partici

pation in a given culture is likely to elicit dissimilar
actions from the participants.

The effects of the culture

are not homogeneous.
One potential solution to the problem is the derivation
of transcultural theories.

The wide differences in specific

cultural traits and the high degree of similarities within
given cultural systems do not exclude the possibility of a
single theory about those systems.

IQ

Bartels states that

"marketing is a universal phenomenon, carried on . . .

in a

manner indigenous to the environment of the culture in which

^■^Ernest Nagel, 0 £. cit., p. 462, discusses this point
as it generally applies to the social sciences. But comments
on the subject that are more specifically directed to
marketing theory are part of an article by: Robert Bartels,
"The General Theory of Marketing," Journal of Marketing,
XXXII (January, 1969), 29-33.
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it occurs."

20

However, in the same article one of his

primary propositions is that "a contemporary general theory
of marketing is implicit in a sufficiently broad concept of
marketing.1,21

Bartels' "General Theory of Marketing" is

then a transcultural theory.

Transcultural theory is of

necessity highly abstract, but this abstraction does not
keep it from being useful.
This section has presented several difficult problems
that must be solved if marketing is to become a science.
Each problem was accompanied by a tentative solution.

While

these solutions illustrate a way of overcoming the problems,
the problems have not been eliminated.

Also, other problems

exist that may become more formidable than they now appear.
The result is that while nothing now seems to be an absolute
styme to the development of science in marketing, the future
of the effort can not be predicted.

The following quotation

by George Schwartz summarizes the status of science in
marketing:

20

Bartels, 0 £. cit., p. 31.

21Ibid., p. 32.
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Since acceptable proof of the possibility or impos
sibility of developing a science of marketing has
not yet been forthcoming, one might suggest that
we will know whether such a feat is possible only
when success is attained in obtaining the know
ledge which meets the requirements of a science.

DESIRABILITY OP SCIENCE IN MARKETING

The discourse in this section is used to establish some
of the benefits derived from marketing becoming a science and
to illustrate some of the possible normative objections to
that path.

The section also deals briefly with existing

marketing trends toward science.

The net purpose is to

determine the desirability of science in marketing.

Favorable Aspects of Science in Marketing
Many people find satisfaction in science because they
believe in the existence of an intrinsic value of knowledge.
Madden expresses that viewpoint as follows:

"...

Science,

like any other study, is intrinsically valuable because it
produces knowledge —

something which is valuable in and of

itself independently of what we can do with i t ."

23

The

human trait that gave birth to the intrinsic value of

22

George Schwartz, Science in Marketing, New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1965, p. 1.
23Edward H. Madden, The Structure of Scientific Thought,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961, p. 367.
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knowledge is the desire for beauty, and knowledge of many
of the worldly phenomena was considered beautiful.

The

eloquent passage that follows shows recognization of the
existence of this aspect of knowledge and illustrates its
origin.
Science in its beginnings was due to men who were
in love with the world. They perceived the beauty
of the stars and the sea, of the winds and the
mountains. Because they loved them their thoughts
dwelt upon them, and they wished to understand
them more intimately than a mere outward contempla
tion made possible. ^
The shift from infatuation

with the beauty of knowledge to

the impersonal application

of knowledge to everydayprob

lems was gradual but decisive.

Bertrand Russell summarizes

the change in the following quotation.
But step by step, as science developed, the im
pulse of love which gave it birth has been in
creasingly thwarted, while the impulse of power,
which was at first a mere camp-follower, has
gradually usurped command in virtue of its un
foreseen success. The
lover of nature has been
baffled, the tyrant over nature has been re
warded. ^5
From a more practical viewpoint, three interrelated
goals of science are important to marketing.
explanation, prediction, and control.

The goals are

The latter two can be

^Bertrand Russell, The Scientific Outlook, New York:
W. W. Norton, 1931, p. 262.
25Ibid., p. 263
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satisfied if the former, explanation, is achieved.

The

importance of explanation to science is great, and in some
cases the two are considered to be the same thing.

This

role of explanation in science is illustrated in the follow
ing quotation.
To explain the phenomena in the world of our ex
perience, to answer the question "Why?" rather
than only the question "what?", is one of the
foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and
especially, scientific research in its various
branches strives to go beyond a mere description
of its subject matter by providing an explanation
of the phenomena it investigates.26
Further emphasis on the role of explanation in science is
given by a statement of Ernest Nagel.
It is the desire for explanations which are at
onqe systematic and controllable by factual evi
dence that generates science; and it is the organ
ization and classification of knowledge on the
basis of explanatory principles that is the dis
tinctive goal of the sciences.
Explanation, prediction, and control can benefit
marketing.

The marketing practitioner, teacher, student, re

search analysts, and possibly the consumer benefits with the
achievement of these goals.

To the marketing practitioner,

26

Carl G. Heropel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the
Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of Science, XV (April,
1948), 135.
27

Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York:
Barcourt. Brace and world, 1961, p. 4.
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the ability of prediction and control greatly reduces the
risk of uncertainty.

The marketing teacher and student"have

"a connected and systemized body of truths possessing gener
ality in form"28 that facilitates the teaching and learning
of the subject.

Also, the marketing research analyst de

sires that marketing be made a science so that he may have
a coherent body of theory to direct his investigations.

The

consumer is the one person to which the benefits derived
from making marketing scientific are offset with some im
pressive disadvantages.

Advantages do still exist.

With

marketing more scientific its efficiency is improved.
improvement drives down the price of goods in general.

This
Also,

the type of good that the consumer desires is easier to
determine and provide.

Many similar technical benefits

accrue to the consumer but not without cost.

This cost is

normative rather than positive in nature and is discussed in
the following section.

Encroachment of Human Privacy
Offsetting the benefits of scientific marketing is the
problem on encroachment of human privacy.

28

The encroachment

Definition of science. Chapter I, p. 8.
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occurs because a large amount of personal information about
the consumer is needed in order to achieve explanation,
prediction, and control of his purchasing actions.

.The ac

cumulation of aggregate figures is not sufficient to accom
plish the task.

Individualistic figures are also needed as

evidenced by experiences in other scientific areas.

Bio

logists study the individual cell before making statements
about groups of cells.

Chemists evaluate the properties of

a molecule of a substance before making statements about
that substance in general.

Similarly, physicists search

for the structure of an atom before making predictions about
groups of like atoms.

In order to explain the actions of

any system, a thorough knowledge of the elements that make
up that system is highly desirable.

The: more exact the ex

planation required, the more individualized the information
needed by a scientist.
The consumer is the center of attention in a marketing
system.

As a human, the consumer may object to a marketing

scientist treating him in the same manner that other
scientists treat cells, molecules, and atoms.

The infringe

ment upon human privacy thus creates a normative problem.
This infringement makes the desirability (value judgment) of
developing science in marketing questionable.
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The problem of encroachment: on human privacy may ulti
mately provide the critical constraint that stops market
ing's movement towards developing a science.

Until that

point is reached, marketing can make good use of aggregate
figures and those individualistic figures which exist.
What occurs after man puts a stop to the encroachment re
mains to be seen.

Marketing *s Move Toward Science
The desirability of developing marketing into a science
is tempered by what progress has been made to this point in
time.

Recent occurrences in the field of marketing illus

trate interest in the scientific development of the area.29
;

Buzzell believes that the most noteworthy occurrence was
the establishment of the Marketing Science Institute in 1962.
The organization is dedicated to fundamental research in
marketing, and it is supported by 29 large corporations.
Another major development has been the commitment of the
American Marketing Association to the "advancement of science
in marketing."

30

Buzzell also mentions several recent books

29
These occurrences were taken from an article by:
Robert D. Buzzell, "Is Marketing a Science?", Harvard Busi
ness Review, XLI (January-February, 1963), 32-33.

30Printed on their current membership certificates.
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that are concerned with the development of science in
marketing as an illustration of interest in the area.
Split in Marketing Over Usefulness of Science:

31
The

development of science in marketing has been met with skep
ticism by practitioners.

Buzzell states that " . . .

when

executives are asked to consider the social and economic
process of marketing as a science or prospective science,
most confess to extreme skepticism."32

This skepticism has

tended to keep executives from using scientific methods in
their marketing decision making.

Gradually a split between

practitioner and academician developed over the use of
scientific methods in marketing.

The following quotation

illustrates how one person analyzes the cause and severity
of the split.
. . . none of these executives would describe their
intuitive process for reaching decisions as being
attenuated. Thus, they are forced into the posi
tion of being antiscientific because scientific and

31

Buzzell mentions the following texts: Robert Bartels,
The Development of Marketing Thought, Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1962, 284 pp.; Edward C. Bursk, Text and
Cases in Marketing: A Scientific Approach, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962, 580 pp.; and because of the
several theory articles it contains: William Lazer and
Eugene Kelley (editors), Managerial Marketing: Perspectives
and Viewpoints, 3rd ed., Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, 1967, 764 pp.
32Buzzell, o p . cit., p. 32.
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mathematical efforts to explain the marketing
process tend to be superficial and attenuated
— not practical and powerful.
The split is really one between the intuitive process
and the scientific process or between art and science.

C.

P. Snow discusses what he labeled a cultural split not un
like the division in marketing.34

His discussion indicates

that perhaps the marketing problem is only part of a much
broader division.

According to Snow, western society is

split into two groups.

These two groups consist of the

artistic or creative, and the scientific elements of society.
It is Snow's view that the groups are totally intolerant of
each other and understand little of the other's position.
Practitioner Acceptance;

In spite of the split in

marketing, executives must be practical to stay in business,
and marketing men eventually use an. approach if it appears
to be most profitable.

Business management has already

started to apply scientific techniques and employ greater
money and effort to obtain more information for decision
m

a

k

i

n

g

.

Robert Ferber also acknowledges that fact in the

33Martin K. Starr, "Marketing Science and Management
Science," Management Science, X (April, 1964), 559.
34C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revo
lution, Mew York: Cambridge University Press, 1961.
35See Melvin Anshen, "Management Science in Marketing:
Status and prospects," Management Science, II (April, 1956),
223.
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following quotation.
The two most striking developments in marketing
research in the past few years have been its
widespread acceptance by business and its rapid
technical progress. As might be expected, the
simultaneous occurrence of the two developments
has created an unprecedented demand for more
knowledge.36
According to Anshen and Ferber some application of scienti
fic techniques now exist in business.

The application of

scientific procedure in executive decision-making may signal
the beginning of the end of the practitioner-academician
division.

If the end occurs, scientific techniques for ob

taining knowledge appear able to at least partially replace
intuition in executive decision-making.

The end result may

be a movement by marketing toward the establishment of
science in the field.
The establishment of the Marketing Science Institute,
the dedication of the American Marketing Association to
science in marketing, the recent texts devoted to science
and theory in marketing, and the possible demise of the split
between academicians and practitioners all tend to indicate
that a trend exists which points toward the development of
science in marketing.

The trend has developed to this stage

Robert Ferber, Marketing Research, New York;
Hill Book Company, 19 63, p. xiii.

McGraw-
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either because of or in spite of the desirability of
science in marketing and seems likely to continue.

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter was to establish the role
and importance of epistemology in marketing.

The importance

or value of epistemology wds determined to be the aid it
provided in developing science in marketing.

Further, the

value of epistemology was given as a function of (1) the
efficiency it exhibits in developing science, and (2) the
desirability of science in marketing.

The purpose of the

chapter was accomplished by analyzing these two aspects of
epistemology.
The efficiency of epistemology in developing science
represents the ability to accomplish this feat.

Episte

mology can benefit the development of science in marketing,
but it is not a cure-all for the problems which are en
countered.

In addition to the normal problems faced by

scientists in the physical sciences, marketing must solve
several others.

Most of these additional problems are the

result of the fact that both the subject of the investiga
tion and the investigator are human beings.

While none of

these problems eliminate the possibility of developing theory
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and science in marketing, they create many difficulties.
The conclusion on efficiency is that epistemology was de
termined to be the source of knowledge upon which science
is built.

If marketing is to become scientific, the pos

session of a sound epistemology by marketing scholars is
a valuable asset.
Epistemology is important to science and theory, but
is the development of science in marketing a desirable
goal?

Many people derive benefits from the development of

marketing into a science.

However, the consumer may pay a

dear price for his benefits.
in terms of his privacy.

The cost to the consumer is

Nevertheless, the existing trend

in marketing is toward the development of theory and science
in the area.

CHAPTER III

THE TWO SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the marketing
scientist with adequate background information on available
epistemological approaches.

If the marketing scientist uses

epistemology for developing a better approach to theory
(primary hypothesis), he must be provided with the tools
needed to accomplish the task.

This chapter is an attempt

at providing those tools.
There are two sources of knowledge from which any episte
mology may draw.

These two sources of knowledge are:

(1)

that which is strictly a product of man's mind without re
course to the human senses (a priori knowledge), and (2)
that which is received through the human senses without re
course to man's mental faculties except for perception (a
posteriori knowledge).

Basically, one source of knowledge

relies totally on human perception for knowledge while the
other claims that man's mind may generate truths without
direct use of perception.

An infinite combination of

epistemologies may be generated by applying these two
sources in different degrees.

55

For that reason, an analysis

56
of all epistemologi.es is impossible.

A more reasonable

approach to providing the marketing scientist with needed
information on epistemology is to discuss the two possible
sources of knowledge.

The marketing scientist may then

choose how he wishes to blend these sources in developing
his particular epistemology.
The first major topic analyzed in this chapter is that
of a priori knowledge.

Two qualifying factors relative to

the definition of this source are analyzed.

These qualify

ing factors are the role experience plays in a priori know
ledge and the basis for its existence.

Besides the

qualifying factors, various characteristics of this source
are examined.

The characteristics include areas which ex

hibit a high concentration of a priori knowledge, the fact
that this source is either synthetic or analytic, the fact
that knowledge occurs at two levels, and that a priori know
ledge is always a universal relationship or property.

The

concluding discussion on a priori knowledge is an analysis
of its role in theory development.
The next major topic discussed in this chapter is that
of a posteriori knowledge.

The source is defined and its

relationship to inductive reasoning is analyzed in the first
section of this part.

The basis for empirical generaliza

tions are investigated next.

This investigation includes a
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discussion on the laws of nature, a description of universal
causation, and an analysis of human belief in cause.

The

final discussion in this part is an examination of the role
a posteriori knowledge plays in theory development.

A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE

The first potential source of knowledge analyzed in
this chapter is that which is strictly a product of man's
mind without recourse to perception.
is known as a priori.

This kind of knowledge

In this case, the individual possesses

a store of knowledge which was not previously available to
him and that was totally generated by the mind.

A priori

knowledge may then be called that self-evident knowledge
which is independent of experience.
The intent of this section is to provide an inquiry
into the nature of a priori knowledge.

Included in the in

quiry are discussions on the function of experience in a
priori knowledge, areas where this source is in high con
centration, an analysis of its basis, various characteristics
of its existence, and the role it plays in developing theory.

Function of Experience
The phrase "independent of experience" in the preceding
definition of a priori knowledge needs to be qualified.

Ex

perience precedes all understanding, and in that sense, it
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is an integral part of all knowledge.

Experience conies

first, then a priori knowledge appears.

Locke states:

Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say,
white paper, void of all characters, without any
ideas; how comes it to be furnished? . . .
Whence has it all the materials of reason and
knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from
experience; in that all our knowledge is founded,
and from that it ultimately derives itself.^
Bertrand Russell concurs with Locke's view on the relation
between universals and particulars.

Russell states simply,

"No fact concerning anything capable of being experienced
can be known independent of experience."2

But even though

human cognition begins with experience, it is not necessarily
true that experience is the sole source of knowledge.

Kant

states, "But although all our cognition begins with experi
ence, still on that account, all does not precisely spring
out of experience."

For example, a child may learn to

count through a process that involves contact with physical
objects.

This "sense-experience" contact allows the child

to develop a concept about numbers.

The child learns the

*-John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under standing,
Boston: Cummings & Hilliard and J. T. Buckingham, 1813,
Vol. I, p. 96.
2Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 105.
^Immanuel Kant, Critik of Pure Reason, London: William
Pickering, 1838, 655 pp.

meaning of “one," "two," "four," etc.

But now suppose the

child performs the arithmetic, two plus two equals four.
While the concept of physical objects as numbers plays a
part, the problem's solution can be seen through just the
operation of thought.

No contact is necessary with physi

cal objects to perform the operation.

Some philosophers

would label knowledge of the problem's solution a priori
knowledge.

In that sense, the knowledge of the problem's

solution is "independent of experience” and self-evident.
The criteria for a priori knowledge have been satisfied.

The Basis for A Priori Knowledge
What is the basis for the phenomenon of a priori know
ledge?

How does a priori knowledge occur?

The purpose of

this section is to seek an answer to these questions.

To

accomplish the purpose, a discussion of innate ideas and a
more accepted view are examined.
Innate Ideas as a Basis for A Priori Knowledge:

Many

approaches and variations to the explanation of a priori
knowledge have been elucidated.

The concept of "innate

ideas" as the source of a priori knowledge was highly prom
inent at one time.

Spinoza's doctrine, as furthered by
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Descartes, was the groundwork used to develop this view.4
Locke describes the belief as follows:
It is an established opinion amongst men, that
there are in the under b tanding certain innate
principles some primary notions, characters as
it were, stamped upon the mind of man, which
the soul receives in its very first being, and
brings into the world with it.6
But Locke also severely attacked the doctrine of innate ideas
as a preliminary act to the development of his own thesis.6
Leibniz critically evaluated Locke's Essay Concerning Human
Understanding from the point of view of rationalism and defended the concept of "innate ideas" against Locke's attack.

7

Rationalism may be defined broadly as the doctrine where
reason only is the source of knowledge independent of the
perception by our senses.
Philosophers since the time of the early Greeks have
puzzled over the basis of a priori knowledge.

In the early

writings of Plato, he seemed highly perplexed on the subject.
In an attempt to explain a priori knowledge, Plato invented
a myth that the soul remembers visions from some life before

4Gutmann, o p . cit., p. 113.
5Locke, 0 £. cit., p. 42.
6Locke, 0 £. cit., pp. 42-95.
^Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, New Essays Concerning Human
Understanding, Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company,
1916, 861 pp. The defense of innate ideas in Book I, pp.
65-108.
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birth.

This description resembles that of innate ideas.

Plato wrote the following supposed dialogue between Socrates
and Meno which refers to mathematical knowledge shown by
one of Meno*s uneducated slaves.
Soc.

But if he did not acquire the knowledge in
this life, then he must have had and learned
it at some other time?

Men.

Clearly he must.

Soc.

Which must have been the time when he was
not a man?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

And if there have been always true thoughts
in him, both at the time when he was and was
not a man, which only need to be awakened into
knowledge by putting questions to him, his
soul must have always possessed this know
ledge, for he always either was or was not a
man?

Men.

Obviously.

p

The innate idea doctrine as the explanation of the basis for
a priori knowledge is now somewhat out of vogue.
A More Accepted View on the Basis for A Priori Know
ledge ;

Philosophers, not so imaginative as Plato, view a

priori knowledge as a product of man's mind apart from the
physical world.

Locke recognized the existence of a priori

Q

Plato, "Meno," The Dialogues of Plato (Book VII of the
Great Books of the Western World, publisher William Benton,
54 volumes, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), pp.
182-183.
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knowledge and discussed it in detail.

Locke felt that a

priori knowledge was freely generated by the mind through
a process he labeled "reflection."
This source of ideas every man has wholly in him
self; and though it be not sense, as having nothing
to do with external objects, yet it is very like it,
and might properly enough be called internal sense
. . . I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords
being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on
its own operations within itself.9
This definition of a priori knowledge is compatible with
that which was given in the beginning of this section.

Characteristics of A Priori Knowledge
Several characteristics of a priori knowledge may be
important to the marketing scientist.

This section is

primarily an analysis of these characteristics.

They in

clude the fact that certain areas contain high concentrations
of a priori knowledge, that this source may be divided into
synthetic and analytic, and that while knowledge occurs at
two levels, a priori knowledge is always a universal rela
tionship or property.
The discourse that follows represents some of the prom
inent views on a priori knowledge.

An attempt was made, in

some cases, to generalize the viewpoints of several people

9Locke, op. cit., p. 97.

63
under one lable.

Such generalizations are risky because

most individual beliefs are held to varying degrees and
usually contain special stipulations which differ.

In this

section the common points of agreement are featured.
High Concentration Areas of A Priori Knowledgei

While

a priori knowledge may occur in any area of study, a charac
teristic of this source is that certain branches of knowledge
appear to be more lavishly endowed with it than others.
Arithmetic is an area that provides many examples for the
proponents of a priori knowledge.

Individuals appear to

exhibit abstract understanding about higher and lower levels
of mathematics.

If lower levels of arithmetic appear diffi

cult to separate from the physical world consider examples
in calculus.

This area contains general and abstracted

problems which are still believed to be universally true.
Individual understanding of these problems may be independ
ent of experience and considered totally a product of man's
mind.
Another important area used for examples of a priori
knowledge is that of geometry.

The following quotation

provides such an example from geometry.
The drawn triangle may provide the occasion for
perceiving but it can not itself be the justifi
cation of the fact that the sum of the angles

of all triangles is the same in plane geometry.*-®
Consumer behavior and executive action are of special
interest to the marketing scientist.

Both of these areas

may be grouped under the heading of human action.

While

views are not consistent on the extent of a priori know
ledge in this area, some individuals believe that it is the
only acceptable form.

"The science of human action that

strives for universally valid knowledge is the theoretical
system. . . .

In all of its branches, this science is a

priori, not empirical."*-1

Executive action and consumer be

havior are also partly determined by the individual's sense
of values.

Even though an individual may never experience

a given situation, he often injects in with his sense of
values,

. . i n the cognition of things, its (a priori

knowledge) role is different from that which it serves in
connection with spiritual objects? the cognition of values
rests on an a priori knowledge. . . #"12
All A Priori Knowledge is Synthetic or Analytic:
Immanuel Kant popularized two types of a priori knowledge.1-*

lOjames Gutmann (editor), Philosophy A to Z,
Grosset & Dunlap, 1963, p. 112.

New York

^ L u d w i g von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Econo
mics, New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1960, p. 12.
12Gutmann, op. cit., p. 112.
13Kant, o|>. cit., 655 pp.
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Kant called the two types analytic and synthetic.

Briefly,

analytic a priori knowledge is true in and of itself and
adds nothing to man's store of knowledge.

However, syn

thetic a priori knowledge is known to be true through the
action of man's mental faculties and does add to his store
of knowledge.

These two types are characteristics of a

priori knowledge only.
Kant noticed, as did Locke before him, that in a cer
tain type of a priori statement, the truth was determined
merely by recognizing that nothing can both have and not
have the same property at the same time.

These kinds of

statements are true in and of themselves.
examples illustrate such statements.
equal sides.

The following

A cube has twelve

A retailer sells directly to consumers.

Drop-shippers are marketing middlemen.

Kant pointed out

that the predicates of these kinds of statements are con
tained in the s u b j e c t s . T h e predicates are part or all
of the definition of the subject.
proposition analytic.

Kant names this type of

While Kant believed analytical state

ments are "highly important and necessary," he also felt
that they do not enlarge existing knowledge.

14Ibid., pp. 10-13,
15Ibid., p. 13.

66
However, Kant did not believe that the analytical type
was the only kind of a priori knowledge.

Kant named the

other kind of a priori knowledge synthetic.

Synthetical a

priori knowledge does not exhibit the subject-predicate
connection that exists in the analytical form.

Kant dif

ferentiates the two types as follows:
Either the predicate B belongs to the subject B,
as something which is contained in the conception
A, (in a covert manner,) or B lies completely out
of the conception A, although it stand in con
nection with it. In the first case, I name the
judgement analytical, in the other synthetical.
The synthetical a priori knowledge is the type that Kant
believed added to the store of knowledge.
In his Critik of Pure Reason, Kant states the belief
that a priori synthetical judgements are contained as prin
ciples in all theoretical sciences o f .reason.-*-7

Mathematics,

Natural Philosophy (Physics), and Metaphysics are cited and
discussed as examples of areas where synthetical judgements
occur.

As a science of marketing can also be considered a

theoretical science of reason, it may be expected to contain
synthetical judgements.
How is it possible that synthetical a priori statements

16Ibid., p. 10
17Ibid., p. 13
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can be denied without self-contradiction, and yet, they are
known a priori to be true?

Basically, Kant's answer is

that primary sense-data (color, hardness, etc.) is supplied
I

by the object with which the individual makes contact,
while the person supplies space and time arrangements.

The

concepts of space and time are viewed as transcendentals
Kant's solution to this question was criticized both by
proponents and critics of a priori knowledge.

19

In spite

of this criticism, Kant's split of a priori knowledge into
analytic and synthetic is still widely used.
A Priori Knowledge is Characterized by Abstract Know
ledge ;

Human understanding may exist at two distinct levels.

One level provides that knowledge which deals with objects
and events as they exist in the physical world.

This type

of understanding is known as particular knowledge.

The other

level of understanding is abstracted from particular know
ledge and deals with things which involve many particulars.
This type of understanding is known as universal knowledge.

18Ibid., pp. 28-55.
^■9See Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (editors) , A Modern
Introduction to Philosophy, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free
Press, 1957, p. 11; Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Phil
osophy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 8790; Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, London:
Victor Gollancz, 1950, pp. 82-87.
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Universal knowledge plays an important role in a priori
knowledge.
Particular knowledge is that information about an in
dividual event or object which is passed to the mind by the
senses.

Russell states that, "We speak of whatever is given

in sensation, or is of the same nature as things given in
sensation, as a particular.

. . .n20

The important parts

of this definition are, that only particular or individual
events are involved, and that the data are collected by the
senses.

When a consumer looks at the price tag on a speci

fic coat, she receives particular knowledge about the price
of that coat.

The world is a mass of particulars inter

acting.
Universals are typically either relationships or
generalized properties.

Universals that are generalized

properties include such things as whiteness, hardness,
angularity, large, people, bears, etc.

Broadly,-adjectives

and substantives that are not proper names fit into this
category.

Universals that are relationships include pre

positions and verbs such as equals, in, greater than, out
side of, by, near, etc.

Similarly, particulars can usually

20Russell, o p . cit., p. 93; much of the discussion on
universals and particulars is taken from this source, pp. 91-

110 .
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be given a proper name and at least, as in the case of
pronouns, are represented by something that replaces a
proper name.

Even the ambiguous particulars, such as the

word "now," represents some specific thing (e.g., 10:00
A.M., Tuesday, January first).
Universals are abstractions of properties possessed
by particulars.

The process of abstraction is easy to

visualize in the early development of a child.

The first

words spoken by a child usually represent particulars.

It

is easy to speculate that he first learns of particulars
such as specific objects or people with which he comes in
contact.

Following the child's education still further,

suppose he gradually makes contact with many more objects
than before and several of these are similar in nature.
For example, besides the mother and father, he has come in
contact with many other friends and relatives.

All of these

individuals are somewhat different, but all possess certain
similarities.

From these individual contacts, the first

universals are understood.

Instead of several different

individuals, it becomes possible to develop by, first under
standing particulars, and then abstracting to universals.
Besides being abstracted general properties, univer
sals also occur as relationships.

Consider the relationship

between two gas stations (station X and station Y) which
operate across the street from each other.

The statement,

station X is near station Y represents a relationship be
tween the particulars station X and station Y.

The word

that expresses the relationship is "near,” and as such, it
is a universal.
A Priori Knowledge is a Relationship Between Universals
Relationships exist between universals just as they do be
tween particulars.

For example, an individual easily per

ceives the resemblance between shades of the same color.
Light blue and dark blue are quite different from red and
they are still classified under the same universal "blue."
To understand relationships between universals, a greater
power of abstraction is required than the initial compre
hension of universals from particulars.

However, individu

al abilities to understand these resemblances at higher
levels of abstraction appear very effective.
According to some of the proponents of a priori know
ledge, all instances of this source involve relationships
between universals.
ample.

21

Arithmetic provides the simplest ex

In the statement "two and two equals four," two.

21Ibid., p. 103.
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equals, and four are all universals.

Also, the equation is

claimed to illustrate a priori knowledge because individuals
know that any and all combinations of two pairs equals four.
This knowledge can exist without any contact between the
individual and four objects.

An individual is certain that

two pebbles and two pebbles on Mars still equals four peb
bles.

This statement of a priori knowledge represents a

relation between universals.
But while a priori knowledge occurs as relations be
tween universals, empirical generalizations may also appear
in this form.22

To determine the nature of a given proposi

tion, the evidence upon which it rests must be considered.
If the evidence for the truth of the proposition is based on
sense data, it is an empirical generalization.

If the basis

is intuitive, the proposition is based on a priori knowledge.
For an example of an empirical generalization based on
universals, consider the statement, "All people who are
alive have at least one of their five senses."
senses are both universals.

People and

The information in this state

ment is based on the observation of a large number of people,
without finding one exception.

22Ibid., p. 107.

Then, the statement is an

empirical generalization based on universals.

Compare this

example with the statement, "Two and two equals four,"
Again, the statement compares universals.

But, as was ex

plained in the prior discussion, an individual's knowledge
that this statement will always be true is based on intui
tive insight.
may occur:

Russell believes that the intuitive insight

(1) after and because of an empirical generali

zation, or (2) without a single contact with the particular.

Role in Theory Development
The recognition of a priori knowledge as one possible
valid epistemology allows it to be used in scientific ex
planation and theory development.

If the entire explanation

is based on synthetic a priori knowledge, the result may be
called the "Synthetic A Priori Method of Scientific Explana
tion."

The synthetic a priori method is better known as the

pure deductive method, but both names are

u s e d .

34

The pure

deductive method applies logic to basic synthetic a priori
truths in order to deduce the desired explanation.

There

fore, only logic and synthetic a priori truths are necessary

23Ibid., p. 107.
A

«|

See the discussion in James H. Ryan, An Introduction
to Philosophy, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924, pp.
18-19.
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to the pure deductive method.

The process is identical to

the definition of scientific explanation in chapter I.
Ryan describes the method as follows:

"(The pure deductive

method) proposes to deduce . . . from a central simple
truth, intuitively known, to a whole series of secondary
truths, more complex than the original datum."

25

The purely deductive method is generally criticized
from two points of view.

First, the existence of a priori

knowledge is questioned by some philosophers.

Second, the

purely deductive method does not apply knowledge available
from empirical generalizations.

Most of the philosophers

that are proponents of a priori knowledge do not exclude the
possibility of a posteriori knowledge.

26

The joint applica

tion of the two sources of knowledge is a possible solution
to the selection of an epistemology.

A POSTERIORI KNOWLEDGE

The aim of the discussion in this section is to analyze
the nature and scope of a posteriori knowledge.

Included in

following discourse are the definition of a posteriori

25Ibid., p. 18.
26

Notable exceptions have already been mentioned. Ration
alism offers one example and Ludwig von Mises' episteraological proposal for economics is another.
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knowledge, an analysis of the basis for induction, and its
role in theory development.

Definition
A posteriori knowledge is defined as that knowledge
which comes directly from individual senses.

The informa

tion provided by the senses relates directly to the object
of the perception and yields "particular" knowledge about
that individual object.

The word "particular" applies in

the same sense that it did in the discussion of a priori
knowledge.

Concrete objects and events that are capable of

stimulating the human senses are the only things which are
potential a posteriori knowledge.

Once these objects or

events are perceived, they become a posteriori knowledge.
Virtually no one denies the existence of basic a posteriori
knowledge.

As was mentioned earlier, even the proponents

of a priori knowledge admit that all knowledge begins with
experience.

But individual particular knowledge is of limit

ed value unless universals can be derived from it.

For

example, a significant amount of information may be known
a posteriori about many middle class, middle income consumers.
But unless this information can be turned into universal
statements'about a "class" of consumers, it is not much help
to the marketing scientist.

The marketing scientist is
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limited to statements about the particular people for which
information is available.
To obtain "universal" knowledge from particular a
posteriori events requires the use of empirical generaliza
tions.

When many similar individual events are observed to

have the same property, it is possible for a person to ab
stract this property and generalize that it is common to all
similar individual events.

For example, an individual re

calls that over his lifetime every bird known to be a crow
which he observed was also black.

When this individual is

quizzed about the color of crows, he generalizes from his
particular knowledge and answers that "All crows are black."
The main tool of the empiricist is a posteriori known
fact.

The job he performs is basically one of accumulating

facts about a particular object in which he is interested.
The following quotation illustrates the scope of the empiri
cist’s task.
The experimental or analytic method is an adaption
to the problems of philosophy of the methods used
in the natural sciences. It consists in the obser
vation, accumulation, and verification of facts.
All speculation or theorizing outside of or above
observable fact is regarded as unscientific, and
therefore incapable of producing truthful results.27

27James H. Ryan, An Introduction to Philosophy, New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1924, pp. 16-17.
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The Basis for Empirical Generalizations
The process of obtaining empirical generalizations from
a posteriori knowledge is commonly known as induction.

The

process involves a generalization from "particulars" to the
whole universe of like objects or events.

Moreover, the

generalization is made for all time, not for just the
present.28

From invariant sense-data about an object or

event, an induction may be made about all similar objects or
events, suitable for all time.
What makes induction possible?
"uniformity of nature."
conditions events recur.

The answer isthe

Uniformity means

that under similar

John Stuart Mill describes the

situation as follows:
We must first observe that there
is a principle
implied in the very statement of
what Induction
is; an assumption with regard to the course of
nature and the order of the parallel cases; . . .
This, I say, is an assumption involved in every
case of induction.28
The Laws of Nature:

Because uniformity of nature is

the basis for induction, some inductions seem to be more reli
able than others.

The generalizations that seem more

28John Hospers, An Introduction to philosophical Ana
lysis, second edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 250.
28John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, London: Longmans,
Green,and Company, 1961, p. 200.
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reliable are based directly on the "laws of nature."

The

less reliable generalizations are less directly related to
the laws of nature.

The generalization that every tine a

pencil is released above the floor (while on earth), it
falls, is based on the law that two masses attract each
other.

The two masses are the earth and the pencil.

This

law yields the more common interpretation which is the law
of gravity.

The statement may be more acceptable than others.

For example, consider this statement, "the sun will rise
tomorrow."

This statement is also based on the laws of

nature, but it is more abstract relative to them.

The

possibility exists that a body from outside the solar sys
tem may strike the earth and change its rotational pattern
causing the sun not to rise tomorrow.

This possibility is

entirely within the framework of the laws of nature.

Be

cause the laws of nature may still be satisfied with induc
tion becoming false, the more abstracted inductions may be
considered less reliable.
A great deal more confidence is shown in the laws of
nature than the occurrence of any particular event.30

Even

in the specific case of the pencil falling, something may
be found within the laws of nature that can offset the law

30

Hospers, oj>. cit., p. 251.
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of gravity.

Nevertheless, the law that two masses attract

each other in a prescribed manner is not likely to be dis
proved.

The law operates so well that the existence of

planets were predicted before they were visualized.
Universal Causation;

While uniformity in nature yields

a satisfactory, broad support for induction, belief in uni
versal causation provides a more basic cornerstone for its
acceptance.

Universal causation carries with it the exis

tence of uniformity in nature.

The assumption that events

have causes is common to even small children and higher order
animals.

The famous Pavlov experiments indicated that a

dog could learn to connedt the ringing of a bell with the
appearance of food.

Similarly, chimpanzes have learned to

connect cause and effect relationships in numerous psy
chological experiments.
A usual definition of cause, and one that is used in
this discourse, describes cause as a sufficient condition.
This definition means that the occurrence of the cause is
sufficient to make the effect unconditionally follow in
sequence.

However, a sufficient condition does not also

need to be a necessary condition.

31

When a cause is both

Much of the following discussion is adapted from
Hospers, Q£. cit., pp. 308-320.

31
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necessary and sufficient, knowledge of the effect also pro
vides knowledge of the cause.

When that occurs, the

particular cause must always be present when the effect is
present.

The following example illustrates the existence

of sufficient but not necessary cause.
A game warden observes a dead duck lying in a pond
from a distance.

The dead duck is viewed as the event, and

the reason for its death is viewed as the cause.

Of the

many possible causes, the game warden recognizes two as be
ing most probable.
disease.

The two causes are (1) hunter, and (2)

Either of these causes is sufficient for the event,

but neither cause is necessary.
caused death.
death.

The hunter alone may have

Similarly, disease alone may have caused

The sufficient but not necessary condition exists

whenever different independent causes are within themselves
sufficient to produce the event.
A formal presentation of the law of universal causation
may aid understanding its nature.

One possible statement is

that, "For every class of events E in the universe, there is
a class of conditions C,

such that whenever an instance of

each member of class C occurs, an instance of E occurs."32

32Ibid., p. 308
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While class C may contain only one element, more often the
class contains a multiple of items.

An explanation of the

occurrence of E is the goal of "scientific explanation."
The event E may be considered to be the explanandum.

Then

just as the explanan of the model may contain several items,
so may C.

The event E is not called an effect.

Effect

implies the automatic existence of cause, while event in
cludes all occurrences.

Event and cause are connected only

through the law of universal causation.
Clarification is also needed on what is meant by "class
of events" and "class of conditions" in the formal defini
tion of universal causation.

While an initial reaction may

be to require each "class" to be identical, this solution is
not entirely satisfactory.

If each class is exactly iden

tical, this solution is not entirely satisfactory.

If each

class is exactly identical, including conditions of time and
space, only one particular event or cause is possible.

The

desirable conditions necessary to a particular class requires
that events and causes be identical except for time and/or
space.

The conditions are met when either time or space or

both are different and everything else is identical.

The

same example of hunter and the dead duck may be used to
illustrate the differences.

Let the class of conditions have

only one type, called hunters.

Similarly, let the class of
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events have only one type, called dead ducks.

Then two

hunters can each shoot a duck at the same time but in differ
ent places (space).

Another alternative is when the two

hunters shoot a duck from the same blind (space) but at
different times.

In the third alternative, the two hunters

shoot ducks at different times and in different places.
Extent of Human Belief in Cause:

The nature of cause

in many events is extremely difficult to determine.

If a

person understands the branch of physics known as dynamics,
he may feel certain that the path of a stone bouncing down
a hill can be completely determined.

A good chance exists

that he also realizes the extreme difficulty in determining
that path.

Very detailed knowledge is required about each

item with which the rock comes in contact.

Also, similar

detailed information is required about the rock itself and
the initial conditions that started it rolling.

Once the

information is collected, a great deal of technical know
ledge about physics is necessary to calculate the path of
that stone.
In spite of the difficulty that often occurs in deter
mining cause, human nature appears to be such that people do
not doubt its existence.

If a baffling occurrence does not

appear to have a cause, knowledgeable people do not seem to
question the relationship involved between the event and

universal causation.

Rather, these people simply state that

the cause was not found.

As an example, medical researchers

have been searching for a cause of cancer for several gener
ations.

Even after repeated set-backs, the researchers

never question the law of universal causation.

These re

searchers were still firmly convinced that a cause existed.
Apparently people are so convinced that universal causation
exists, an observed difference between events seems to
automatically imply a difference in cause.

Hospers states,

"We take the very fact of there being a difference in the
E's as evidence that there was a difference in the C's.1,33
The firm belief in universal causation makes the law im
possible to disprove.

Individuals seem to accept every in

stance which supports the law, but deny instances in which
cause has not been found.

These individuals do so by stating

that the cause exists but just has not been found.

This

impossibility of disproof is important to understanding the
nature of the law.

Normal empirical generalizations can be

disproved by the occurrence of one instance to the contrary.
Consider the en£>irical generalization that "All crows are
black."

The discovery of one albino crow proves this state

ment false.

The possibility of disproof does not exist for

33Ibid., p. 313
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the law of universal causation.

Characteristics of A Posteriori Knowledge
A posteriori knowledge has certain characteristics that
are peculiar to its nature.

These characteristics become

reasonably apparent once mentioned and do not need a great
deal of elaboration.
First, a posteriori knowledge is characterized by the
fact that it deals with concrete objects or events and does
not involve a mental process except for perception.

These

objects or events exist even if they are not perceived by
man, but they become knowledge when perception occurs.
example, a tree falls in a deserted area of a forest.
person senses the event.
posteriori knowledge.

For
No

Therefore, the event is not a

If someone had been able in some way

to perceive the tree falling, the event then becomes a
posteriori knowledge.
Second, a posteriori knowledge is concerned only with
the physical universe.

Concrete objects or events which

are capable of stimulating the human senses are necessarily
also part of the physical universe.
not so restricted.

A priori knowledge is

It may provide information about any

esoteric topic however far removed from the physical universe.
Third, a posteriori knowledge is dependent upon the
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human senses.

Man's five senses are the communicators which

relate the external facts to the mind.

If it were possible

for a man to exist without any of his senses, that man would
be incapable of obtaining a posteriori knowledge.

This

situation does not exist for a priori knowledge if the man's
mind is still capable of thought.
In the modern world, man's senses are capable of being
highly tuned and amplified through the use of machines.

The

fact that the human eye is capable of perceiving a living
cell through a microscope, does not change the primary nature
of the information obtained.
posteriori.

That information is still a

The microscope does, however, widen the universe

of perceivable objects and events.

Since the widening is

possible, more potential a posteriori knowledge is available
to m a n .

Role in Theory Development
In the process of scientific explanation when the
source of knowledge is a posteriori, the scientist first
collects the observed facts which represents the explanan,
then applies logic to obtain the explanandum.

If the ex-

planans consists entirely of a posteriori knowledge, the
process is known as pure induction.
explanation desired by the scientist.

The explanandum is the
However, for the
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explanandum to be unquestionably true, the explanan must
contain a posteriori knowledge which is unquestionably true.
This situation is undesirable, and perhaps unattainable, to
the scientist.
Theory development is a solution to the problem.

If

less than completely true information is used for the ex
planan in the process of scientific explanation, the resulting explanandum is defined as a theory.

Larger numbers of

known instances of a posteriori events causes greater ac
ceptance of a theory than a smaller number.

Since induction

is a tool of the physical sciences, it has become highly
developed.

A branch of statistics is devoted to induction.

35

Statistical induction is a process that allows the scientist
to make statements of probability concerning the occurrence
of an event.
Up to this point in the discussion, no unanswered argu
ment against the existence of either a priori or a posteriori
knowledge was presented.

To state that arguments against

both exist is a major understatement.

The intent of the

34See the definition of scientific explanation and
theory in Chapter I, pp. 8-10.
O C

Statistical induction is usually a major part of basic
statistics texts. See for example parts 3 and 4 of Stephen
P. Shao, Statistics for Business and Economics, Columbus,
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 1967, pp. 247-486.
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discussion in the next chapter is to briefly examine those
arguments that are most important.

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS

Modern philosophers discuss two possible sources of
knowledge.

Those two sources are knowledge received a priori

and a posteriori.

The two sources may be used separately or

combined in various degrees to establish a suitable epistemology.
A priori knowledge is said to come from intuitive in
sight which is best described as a transcendental state.
This form of knowledge is that which is self-evident and
independent of particular empirical evidence.

Mathematics

and geometry are popular areas from which to provide examples
of a priori knowledge.
In all cases, a priori knowledge is said to consist of
relations between universals rather than particulars.

Parti

cular knowledge is defined to be the information directly
obtained from sense-data of an individual object.

Universal

i

knowledge is (1) information abstracted from a number of
particulars having the same universal property, or (2) re
lations between particulars.

Examples of abstracted univer

sals are whiteness, people, bears, large, etc.

Examples of
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universals that are relations between particulars are in,
around, between, near, etc.
Kant believed that priori knowledge existed in two
states which he called analytic and synthetic.

Analytic a

priori knowledge occurs in propositions that are self
contradictory if either the subject or predicate were re
placed by its negative.
male sibling."

An example, is nMy brother is my

To say that, "My brother is not my male

sibling" is self-contradictory.

Synthetic a priori know

ledge is known to be true without the test of experience
and is not analytic.
The application of only synthetic a priori knowledge to
the explanan in the process of scientific explanation yields
what is known as pure deductive reasoning.

Pure deductive

reasoning is then the result of selecting only a priori know
ledge for an epistemology.
A posteriori knowledge may be equated with particular
knowledge.

This knowledge comes entirely from sense-data

on a particular object.

Facts, as experienced by man, are

its total encompassment.
The application of only a posteriori knowledge to the
explanan in scientific explanation yields what is commonly
known as pure inductive reasoning.

The epistemology of in

ductive -reasoning is then totally made up of a posteriori
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knowledge.
The Intent of this chapter was to illustrate the two
possible sources of knowledge, and by doing so, to provide
the marketing scientist with a number of alternative epistemologies.

These potential epistemologies are the tools

with which the marketing scientist may develop a better ap
proach to marketing theory (primary hypothesis).

Little or

no comment was made of the attacks on each source of know
ledge.

The chapter leaves the impression that two accepted

sources of knowledge do exist.

The discourse in the follow

ing chapter indicates that neither source is absolutely
accpeted as a criterion of truth.

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS WITH THE TWO SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

Strenuous philosophical debate has been directed toward
the value and existence of both a priori and a posteriori
knowledge.

The defendants of each type of knowledge were

less than totally successful in defending it.
is to reduce the effectiveness of each.

The result

How do these prob

lems relate to the hypotheses of the dissertation?

Sub

hypothesis three states that these problems adversely affect
the marketing theorist's efforts at developing science in
marketing.

The primary intent of this chapter is to satisfy

subhypothesis three.

The relation between this subhypothesis

and the primary hypothesis is that the former provides a
constraint to the later.

The primary hypothesis, and the

other subhypotheses, discuss the improvement which study of
epistemology can produce in marketing theory.

The con

straints indicate that the proper application of epistemology
is not a panacea or cure-all, but its proper use may still
provide considerable aid to the development of marketing
theory.
89
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The existence and value of basic a priori knowledge is
questioned, and the first major section of this chapter is
used to examine these arguments.

First, a discussion of

the attempt to eliminate arithmetic as synthetic a priori
knowledge is analyzed.
amined.

Then, the attack on geometry is ex

Next, an analysis of arguments relating to other a

priori propositions is presented.
to these arguments.

A rebuttal is then given

Finally, conclusions on the effect of

this debate are analyzed.
Basic a posteriori knowledge is usually accepted as a
source of knowledge, but information induced from it has been
severely criticized.

A section of this chapter is devoted

to an analysis of the problem.
mity in nature is examined.

First, skepticism on unifor

Then the more basic problem

of

universal causation is discussed.
Another major section is used to present an overview of
the problems presented in this chapter.

That section is

used to investigate useful conclusions for the marketing
scientist.

Other major sections are used to present a sum

mary of analysis and an intermediate summary of conclusions.

THE LOGICAL POSITIVIST'S ARGUMENT
ON A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE

Probably the most effective argument today against the
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existence of a priori knowledge was launched by logical
positivism.

These philosophers, known as logical positi

vists, logical empiricists, or simply positivists may be
identified by their beliefs concerning a priori and a
posteriori knowledge.

This group believes that the only

source of knowledge that provides information about the
physical universe is a posteriori.

The logical positivists

questioned the existence of any a priori knowledge that was
not analytic in nature.

Since the positivists' arguments

appear to reduce the effectiveness of a priori knowledge,
this section of the chapter is used to analyze their com
plaints.

This group attacked each type of example that was

supposed to represent synthetic a priori knowledge.

With

each classification of synthetic a priori knowledge, the
positivists attempted to prove that either the classifica
tion was not a priori, or that it was analytic a priori.
The attack was different for many of the classifications,
but the positivists appeared satisfied that they have elimi
nated synthetic a priori knowledge.
The basic view of the logical positivist is that all
propositions that can be known a priori are necessarily
tautological.

By tautology, the logical positivists mean

essentially what Kant described as analytic propositions.
Analytic statements can be proved true by merely referring
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to the law of noncontradiction.

An analytic statement con

tains both the object of the statement and something which
is defined to be that object or at least part of that object.
However, because something is a tautology does not neces
sarily mean that it is highly simplified.

The statement,

"A man is a person," is a tautology but so are statements
requiring a great amount of reasoning to illustrate the
equivalence.

For example, an equation of calculus may be

transformed, through complex manipulation, into an identity.
In such a case, the equation is a tautology.
" ...

an a priori truth is a tautology.

Ayer states:

And from a set

of tautologies, taken by themselves, only further tautologies
can be validly deduced." 1

Tautological Aspects of Arithmetic
Arithmetic statements such as: 7 + 5 = 12, were con
sidered to be synthetic a priori by Kant and others.2

The

logical positivists argue that arithmetic statements are,
in fact, analytical or tautological.

Bertrand Russell in

■'’Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, London:
Victor Gollancz, 1950, p. 47. Ayer is accepted as a logical
positivist, and his views are used extensively in this dis
cussion.
2Kant's discussion on arithmetic occurs in Immanuel
Kant, Critik of Pure Reason, London: William Pickering,
1838, pp. 13-15.
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Principia Mathematica reduces mathematics to its basic
definitions and logic.3

This accomplishment makes the

field of mathematics analytic by nature since only defini
tions and tautologies remain.

C. I. Lewis draws this same

conclusion.
The truths of mathematics follow merely from
definitions which exhibit the meaning of its
concepts, by purely logical deduction. Judge
ment of such mathematical truth is, thus, com
pletely and exclusively analytic; no synthetic
judgement, a priori or otherwise, is requisite
to knowledge of pure mathematics.4
To understand what is meant by mathematics being analyti
cal, consider the simple example of 7 + 5 = 12.
meant by the numbers 12, 7, or 5?

They mean the sum or

group of 12, 7, and 5 objects, respectively.
means 1+1+1+1 . . .

What is

+1 twelve times.

The number 12

The equation may now be

reduced to identical representations on each side of the
equals sign.

This statement is a tautology.

There are possible retorts to the logical positivist's
view of arithmetic, but they are less than totally effective.
For example, Kant pointed out that it was possible for him
to think of 7 + 5 without thinking of 12, and that this

3Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics, Waw York:
W. W. Norton, 1950, 534 pp. This book is a rewrite of
Principia Mathematica.
^Clarence I. Lewis, Mind and the World-Order, New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929, p. 245.

ability clearly existed if larger numbers were considered.5
Kant's conclusion was that arithmetic propositions such as
7 + 5 = 12 are synthetic.

The response of the logical

positivist is that arithmetic propositions are in no way
laws of psychology.

An individual may find it possible to

think of his brother without thinking that he is his male
sibling.

Nevertheless, the two are connected in a tauto

logical sense.

Large numbers do not change the connection

because no one need immediately observe that connection for
a tautology to exist.

Unreality of Euclid's Geometry
Geometry provides an interesting problem for the logi
cal positivists and one of their most difficult to satisfy.
Kant believed that geometry (the only type known in his day
was Euclidean) is a study of the physical properties of
space.

If this premise is accepted, then geometry provides

numerous synthetic a priori examples.

Kant pointed out:

That the straight line between two points is the
shortest, is a synthetical proposition. For my
conception of straight contains nothing of quan
tity, but only a quality. The conception of
shortness is therefore wholly added, and cannot
be deduced by any analysis from the conception
of a straight line.6

5Kant, Oja. cit., p. 14.
6Kant, o p . cit., p. 15.
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This proposition can not be attacked from the point of view
that the definition of a straight line is the shortest dis
tance between two points because that is not the case.

The

concept of a straight line does not necessarily include the
shortest distance between two points.

The a priorist may

conclude that the statement is not tautological and must
then be synthetic.
The logical positivists ask the question, "What, then,
is the definition of straight?"7

straightness is a quality

which people seem to understand but can not define.
ness fits nothing in the physical world exactly.

Straight

This lack

of connection with the physical world is the grounds upon
which the logical positivists attack the a priori nature of
Euclidean geometry.
Since the time of Kant's Critik other "applied" geo
metries have been developed.

These geometries are applied

in the sense that they fit the physical world.

On the basis

of these geometries, the logical positivists refute the a
priori nature of Euclidean geometry.

Ayer states:

But while the view that pure geometry is con
cerned wi;th physical space was plausible enough
1 "

J' 11 1

M M II I.

I

^John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analy
sis, second edition, Englewood Cliffs, Hew Jersey: PrenticeHall, 1967, p. 197.

in Kant's day, when the geometry of Euclid was the
only geometry known, the subsequent invention of
non-Euclidean geometries has shown it to be mis
taken. We see now that the axioms of a geometry
are simply the logical consequences of these
definitions.8
According to the logical positivists, a geometry which is
not about physical space is not "about" anything.
If the above analysis is correct, how can Euclidean
geometry be so useful?

The concepts of Euclid's geometry

are for the most part perfected abstractions of non-perfect
properties which exist in physical space.

An individual

may easily think of several things, that exist in physical
*

space, which approach the concept of straightness.

The

path of a ray of light, the corner of a building, the edge
of a book, etc., are all examples of things that approach
the concept of straightness.

Because of these kinds of

similarities, Euclid's geometry can be applied to physical
space and is useful.

Arguments on other A Priori Propositions
Another problem faced by the positivists occurs because
of their interpretation of "analytic."

Such phrases as,

"Whatever is colored must be extended," and "Whatever has
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shape has size,

are claimed by some rationalists to be
q
synthetic a priori in nature.
The logical positivists

argue that the propositions are analytical.

They accept

the fact that the statements are universally true, but state
that the rules of language make them so, not intuitive in
sight.

Ayer refers to the proposition that "Nothing can

be colored in different ways at the same time with respect
to the same part of itself," which rationalists call an a
priori judgement-.*0

About this proposition Ayer states:

I am not saying anything about the properties of
any actual thing; but I am not talking nonsense.
I am expressing an analytic proposition, which
records our determination to call a color expanse
which differs in quality from a neighboring color
expanse a different part of a given thing.
In
other words, I am simply calling attention to the
implications of a certain linguistic u s a g e . H
The difference between the rationalists and logical
positivists exists in different definitions of "analytic."
Apparently, two definitions are used by the logical positivists.

12

One of the two definitions of analytic applies

^These propositions and much of the rationalist view
are taken from Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1940, Volume Two, pp. 399-427.
10Ibid., pp, 408-409.
**Ayer, o p . cit., p. 79.
*2Hospers, o p . cit., p. 201.
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to any proposition the negation of which is self-contra
dictory.

This definition does not apply to the priori pro

positions in this section.

For example, in the statement,

"Whatever is colored must be extended," the key words
"colored" and "extended" do not mean the same thing.

The

other definition applies to propositions where the rules of
language make the statement analytic as indicated in the
previous quotation by Ayer.

This second sense of analytic

reduces to the positivists' belief that "a proposition is
analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions
of the symbols it c o n t a i n s . T h e

fact that a second de

finition is required to handle these propositions seems to
take away from the positivists' arguments.

The argument on

the rules of language appears to be more of a quibble than
a sophisticated argument.^

A Rationalist Rebuttal to the Arguments
A key word in the logic of statements in this section
is "implies.”

Each statement may be restructured into the

form A implies B.

For example, "Whatever is colored must be

^ A y e r , op. cit., p. 78.
^ N o t e the discussion on the subject by Blanshard, o p .
cit., p. 410.
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extended" becomes "A is colored implies A is extended."
The prior statement of Mr. Ayer indicates that implication
may be defined in a number of ways, and the fact that one
way is more common than others does not effect its validity
as logic.15

But various definitions of implications do not

serve the purpose of thought which is understanding.
Blanshard believes that "implication" is defined in the
logic of the positivists such that it has no- trace of neces
sity.

For this reason, he rejects their logic,
Blanshard believes that he can justify rejecting the

logic of the positivists.

Logic has been made into an

"idle game" by the positivists.

Originally the discipline

of logic connected thought with an attempt to understand.
Blanshard believes that the positivists have severed this
i.

connection and were wrong in doing so.

In the following

quote Blanshard states:
This immanent end of thought (understanding) is
really a bar to which all logics must submit
themselves, and if a system presents itself in
which the implicatory relation is defined as some
random combination of truth values, it says,
"Does this satisfy the demand of thought for a
connection that is intelligible and necessary?
If not, out it g o e s . " 316

15Ibid., pp. 409.-4111 the argument opposing the view
of the logical positivists is taken entirely from Blanshard
but is intended to be representative of the rationalist view.
15Ibid., p. 413.
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The limited freedom that exists in linguistics to choose
various word conventions does not apply in logic, according
to Blanshard.
An inconsistency also seems to exist in the positivist's
doctrine of conventions.

The positivist holds that logical

laws are conventions and are arbitrary.

However, the

positivist's own practice of philosophy strictly follows
one kind of logic over all others.
given for this procedure.

No justification is

Blanshard accuses the positivists

of, first, stating that all necessary conditions are mere
conventions, then, selecting one necessary condition (a
logic) and allowing no alternatives.
The debate is still going on between the rationalists
and positivists and is stimulating significant controversy.
Blanshard*s views are chosen to represent the rationalists'
attack on the logical positivists because they were felt
to be representative.

Other views exist.

The unsettled

nature of the debate leaves a question on the existence of
synthetic a priori knowledge.

Conclusions about the Arguments
The end result of the debate over the existence and im
portance of a priori knowledge is uncertainty.

This result

is not highly satisfying for the marketing scientist.

A
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decision to accept synthetic a priori knowledge as a valid
source may require some hedging by the marketing scientist
is order to satisfy his peers.

One method of hedging is

to require that all synthetic a priori knowledge be validat
ed by empiricism. ' This approach has gained considerable
backing.

The following quotation is the second and third

steps of which Keynes defines as the deductive method.
Next comes the purely deductive stage, in which
are inferred the consequences that will ensue from
the operation of the forces under given conditions.
Lastly, by a comparison of what has been inferred
with what can be directly observed to occur, an
opportunity is afforded for testing the correct
ness and practical adequacy of the two preceeding
steps, . .
This attempt at hedging also has its problems.

The

problem of major significance lies in the supporting step
of the process.

Induction is required to give support to

the synthetic a priori truths, but induction is also sur
rounded by uncertainty.

THE PROBLEM WITH INDUCTION

The process of induction draws generalizations directly
from a posteriori knowledge, but the basis for this process

17John Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of Political
Economy, fourth edition, New York: Kelley and Millman, 1955,
p. 217.
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is not totally accepted.

In Chapter III# the basis for in

duction was determined to be uniformity in nature and
universal causation.

The attack on induction questions

whether these two foundations of the process are sound.
If uniformity in nature and the law of universal causa
tion are found not to be true, induction is rendered impo
tent.

While the truth of a posteriori knowledge is not

effected# the collection of individual facts derived from
particular sense-data becomes almost useless.

If cause does

not exist, generalizations can not be induced from these
facts.

Skepticism on Uniformity in Nature
David Hume provided the initial impetus for skepticism
on the existence, of universal causation.

18

Hume points out

that empirical generalizations have the built-in presupposi
tion that there is uniformity in nature# and that# unless
support can be given to that presupposition, induction is
impotent.

Further# the question is raised as to what gives

a person the right to make this assumption.

What gives an

individual the right to say that the evidence of the past is

18

David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding#
New York: The Liberal Arts Press# 1955# 198 pp.
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relevant to anything in the future?
. . . all our experimental conclusions proceed
upon the supposition that the future will be
conformable to the past.

On what process of argument is inference founded?
Where is the medium, the interposing ideas which
join propositions so very wide of each other?

If there be any suspicion that the course of
nature may change and that the past may be no
rule for the future, all experience becomes use
less and can give rise to no inference or con
clusion.^9
Is it possible to know that the future will be like the
past?

Precisely as stated, the answer is probably not.

The

only truly satisfactory evidence, if the evidence was pos
sible, is to look into the future and compare what is seen
with what is projected.

The feat is impossible, but the

impossibility does not ruin the usefulness of induction.
If the process of induction is based on the projected
uniformity of nature, how can induction be considered a
logically sound method?

The question has numerous attempted

answers in the literature of philosophy.

19Ibid., pp. 49-51.
20

Hospers, o p . cit., pp. 256-259.
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One of these

answers is a pragmatic justification.

A pragmatic answer

may admit the inability to offer satisfactory proof on the
existence of projected uniformity in nature.

However, the

pragmatist can point to the past and indicate that whenever
he predicted the dropping of a pencil, it did drop when the
future of that prediction occurred.

Historical evidence

exists in large quantities to support the proposition.

The

pragmatist can say that, because of the historical evidence,
he intends to act as if projected uniformity in nature is a
fact.

If a person acts as if projected uniformity is a

fact and the future proves this belief to be untrue, all
his efforts are wasted.

However, the pragmatist may argue

that such wasted effort is no worse than inaction.

Those

people who are afraid to use the inductive process, because
they do not know that the future is like the past, are forced
into that inaction.

Further, the pragmatist may argue,

much can be learned if the future is like the past.
The pragmatist's answer to the problems is a possible
approach, but that approach is not a solution to the problem.
The problem still exists even if individuals choose to ignore
it.

Moreover, this approach flies in the face of everything

that is scientific.
problems?

Is not a science an effort at solving

To ignore a problem that lies at the very base of
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an important tool used by scientists is not a very satis
factory answer.

The only reasonable application of this

approach seems to be when no other satisfactory approach
exists.

The More Basic Problem of Universal Causation
The belief in universal causation is a somewhat more
basic problem.
has a cause?

How can an individual know that every event
The discussion in Chapter III on universal

causation indicates that apparently people do believe that
it exists.

Individuals seem to have knowledge about the

existence of cause that goes beyond the belief in uniformity
of nature.

Yet, the establishment of universal causation

carries with it the existence of uniformity in nature.
Can the law of universal causation be proved by offer
ing the numerous examples of cause and effect as evidence
in its behalf?

The answer is no.

The reason for the answer

lies in what is behind such an attempted proof.
for the proof is induction.

Yet universal causation must be

true for induction to be valid.
involved.

The basis

Thus circular reasoning is

Such a proof begs the question because the law is

the basis for all induction.

Therefore, the many instances

which can be pointed to as examples are not suitable as a
basis for establishing the truth of the law.

What then is the basis for human belxef in the law of
universal causation?

None of the answers to this question

seem totally satisfying.

Hume attempted to solve the prob

lem which he had helped to create in a way that still re
tains some of its validity.

In all empirical generalizations

or inductions, a step is taken by the mind which is "not
supported by any argument or process of understanding."

21

This step implies universal causation, and yet the mind makes
little hesitation in taking it.

Apparently some principle

other than reasoning allows him to draw his conclusions.
Hume states that, "This principle is custom or habit.1,22

If

Hume's explanation is true, then all empirical generaliza
tions are the end products of habit, not of reasoning.

This

solution is not very satisfying to empiricists, but it has
retained a degree of acceptance.
The Indirect Approach:

John Stuart Mill is a well

known ultra-empiricist who believes that an indirect method
of empirical generalization is the proper approach.23

This

21Ibid., p. 55.
22Ibid., p. 56.
23Mill's major work in this area is a support of pure
induction and is found in John Stuart Mill, A System of
Logic, London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1961, 622 pp.
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approach is suitable for use because the antecedent part
of the cause-effect relationship must be s sufficient con
dition.

Mill states:

"Invariable sequence, therefore, is

not synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides
being invariable, is unconditional.1,24

If Mill's definition

is accepted, then no exceptions to cause-effect relationships
are allowable.
Mill realized that circular reasoning occurs when the
proof of the law of universal causation is attempted by the
indirect method.

Also, the impossibility of disproving the

existence of universal causation was discussed and illustra
ted in Chapter III.

The indirect approach is not satisfac

tory in proving the existence of universal causation.

But

Mill argued that in this instance a direct inductive approach
was possible.25

If a large diversified sample exists,

direct introduction is reliable according to Mill.

The law

of universal causation fits this description.
Mill apparently overlooked an important fact in his
analysis that tends to make it impotent against Hume's
argument.

This fact is that the very instances that must

be used, in a direct inductive approach, to satisfy the law

24Ibid., p. 222.
25Ibid., pp. 206-221
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of universal causation are themselves causal laws.

These

supporting causal laws can not be proven by direct induc
tion according to Mill's own theory.

Since these laws can

not be proven by direct induction, and since they are
directly dependent on the law of universal causation, they
are not suitable as proof of universal causation.

Thus

Mill's argument is not a satisfactory solution to the prob
lem of causation.
Source of Knowledge on Cause:

Hume suggested that human

belief in universal causation was nothing more than habit.
The idea that the law is a habit, suggestion, or hope has
some merit.

The primary objection that may be offered to

this explanation is the degree of the law's acceptance.
Hope and habit can generally, be changed through experience
with negative events.

The belief in universal causation

appears to be stronger than mere hope.

While this objec

tion does not negate the explanation, it does raise an
important question.
Another possible explanation of an individual's know
ledge about universal causation is that this knowledge is
synthetic a priori in nature.

This explanation agrees

favorably with the observed high degree of acceptance
previously mentioned.

The possibility is not a happy one
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for the ultra-empiricist who does not believe in a priori
knowledge.

The truth of this possibility means that all

induction is based on a law known a priori.
Other possibilities exist, but the inability to de
finitely explain universal causation is a severe blow to
the process of induction.

The fact that empiricists can

not be sure of the basis for all their inductions, leaves
it in much the same state of uncertainty that exists with
a priori knowledge.

Therefore, the inductive process is

not capable of eliminating the uncertainty surrounding
synthetic a priori knowledge.

This state of uncertainty

is what marketing scientists must face when searching for
a source of knowledge upon which to base their theories.
The effect of this uncertainty on the marketing scientist
is the topic of the following section.

CONCLUSIONS FOR THE MARKETING SCIENTIST

After reviewing all of the arguments against the various
forms of knowledge, what conclusions may be made by the
marketing scientist?

The primary conclusion must be, that

the best which may be expected is uncertainty.

This con

clusion is in total agreement with subhypothesis three which
states, "That unsettled differences among authorities on
epistemology adversely effect the ability of marketing
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theorists to develop the field into a science."

Like a

great many things related to man and his universe, uncer
tainty is the best an individual may expect to know.

While

uncertainty is nothing new to the marketing man, the purpose
of working toward the development of science in marketing
is to significantly reduce uncertainty,

of what value is

the study of epistemology to the marketing scientist if un
certainty is its end result?
Knowledge of epistemology provides the marketing sci
entist with a valuable weapon against uncertainty in spite
of the fact that uncertainty is a part of both sources of
knowledge.

Uncertainty occurs in degrees, normally referred

to as probability of occurrence.

Greater assurance provided

an individual about the truth of an explanation or pre
diction proportionally reduce uncertainty.

The physical

sciences have used scientific methodology to reduce uncer
tainty until it is almost eliminated.

Within the physical

sciences, the primary element of uncertainty which remains
is that which is related to epistemology.
The following illustration may aid understanding.

To

some degree, people can not be sure that universal causation
exists.

Still, if we assume the existence of universal

^ C h a p t e r I, p. 3

Ill
causation, and then predict a pencil will fall to the floor
when dropped because a law of nature causes it to do so,
the prediction is highly probable.

Note that the prediction

is not certain, but it is highly probable.

Would not a

marketing scientist be exceedingly happy knowing that one
of his explanations about channel systems is only as prob
able as the prediction of a pencil falling when dropped?
The answer is obvious and a tremendous amount of advancement
must be achieved before the level of assurance is possible
in a science of marketing.
aid in making advances.

A knowledge of epistemology can

The basic process of epistemologi-

cal assistance to the development of science in marketing
was examined in Chapter IX.
But do these uncertainties force the marketing scientist
into accepting the role of a pragmatist?
"not necessarily."

The answer is

The marketing theorist may play a major

role in the search for the nature and criterion of truth.
Since the job of a scientist is the reduction of uncertainty
and since the uncertainty of epistemology is part of all
sciences, then the job of a marketing theorist logically
includes the epistemological problems.

However, the fact

that the marketing scientist may face the epistemological
problems does not mean that he can not use epistemology to
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aid him in solving other problems.
When a marketing scientist devises a theory, he has
automatically selected an epistemology.

That epistemology

may not be consciously known, or it may be completely mis
understood.

Epistemological errors can easily occur under

this type of situation.

A thorough knowledge of the area

by marketing scientists may prevent, or at least reduce,
these errors.

Elimination of the errors increases the prob

ability of successful explanation of the theory.

Knowledge

of epistemology and its uncertainties by the marketing
scientist allows him to make the best usage of this tool.

SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter was to present some of the
arguments opposing the two sources of knowledge.

The effec

tiveness of both a priori and a posteriori knowledge were
reduced by these attacks.
Logical positivism contains one of the most strenuous
and most effective attacks on a priori knowledge.

The major

premise of the attack is that synthetic a priori knowledge
does not exist.

Only analytic a priori knowledge is admitted.

But, analytic a priori knowledge is not a meaningful source
upon which the marketing scientist can base theory.

The

positivist's attack is aimed at each individual supposed
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source of synthetic a priori knowledge.

An attempt is made

to show that arithmetic is tautological or analytic.

The

propositions of Euclid's geometry are not allowed as syn
thetic a priori knowledge on the grounds that the proposi
tions do not represent anything in the physical world.
Other supposed synthetic a priori known statements are also
eliminated by the positivists.

This last group is said to

be analytic because of the way language is used.

The last

attack by the positivists requires a modification of the
definition of analytic.

Rationalists do not accept the

verdict of the logical positivists on a priori knowledge.
The result of the debate seems uncertain.
The existence of a posteriori knowledge is generally
not questioned, but more important, the use that can be made
of it is doubted.
causation.

The problem exists in the nature of

The whole process of scientific explanation is

based on a search for cause or explanation.

The belief in

universal causation is apparently deeply embedded in
knowledgeable human understanding,

in fact, knowledge is

often equated with the understanding of many causal rela
tionships .
But Hume asked about the nature of cause, "Where does
knowledge of causation come from?11 The belief in universal
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causation is at the base of empirical generalizations.
Therefore, an attempt to use induction to prove the exist
ence of universal causation results in circular reasoning.
Moreover, a close analysis of the nature of universal causa
tion indicates the inability to disprove the proposition.
Hume's own answer to the problem is that individual belief
in universal causation is nothing more than habit.

This

answer retains some credence but does not reasonably explain
the intenseness of the belief.

Another solution is that the

individual knowledge is synthetic a priori.
possibilities have been suggested.

Still other

The end result is con

siderable uncertainty.
The intent of this chapter was to illustrate some of
the problems a marketing scientist is going to have in
selecting his source(s) of knowledge.
is important in developing theory.

A sound epistemology

The initial, and perhaps

most difficult step, in the development of marketing theory
is selection of a sound epistemology.
INTERMEDIATE SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

This point in the dissertation marks the division be
tween theoretical analysis and empirical analysis.

For

that reason, this summary of conclusions is provided.

The

115
theoretical analysis in the prior chapters was developed to
illustrate what part epistemology plays in the developing
marketing theory.

The accomplishment of this feat required

three chapters.
Chapter II was used to establish the basic role and
value of epistemology to marketing theory.

Value was deter

mined to be a function of (1) the efficiency of epistemology
in aiding the development of science in marketing, and (2)
the desirability of making marketing a science.
Efficiency may be interpreted to mean how well episte
mology can accomplish its task.

Apparently epistemology and

methodology in general are not cure-alls, but they can be a
great deal of help.

However, the development of science in

marketing is faced with several problems in addition to those
normally dealt with in the physical sciences.

These addi

tional problems make the methodology more complex but do not
seem to destroy the possibility of science in marketing.
The desirability of developing science in marketing also
aids in determining the role and value of epistemology.

The

increase of knowledge in marketing,..necessary to the develop
ment of science, may require the reduction of consumer
privacy.

The cost of the effort may be more than people are

willing to pay.

But in spite of this cost, marketing men

have embarked upon the path to science.
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Chapter III was used to investigate what sources of
knowledge were available to marketing scientists in order
that they may develop a sound epistemology.

The two pos

sible sources were discovered to be a priori and a
posteriori.

A priori knowledge is that self-evident know

ledge which is independent of experience.

This kind of

knowledge always deals with the connection of universals
according to one group of philosophers.

The source of a

priori knowledge is deemed transcendental, and it is com
monly known as intuitive insight.
A posteriori knowledge is a product of individual sensedata.
him.

An individual knows what his senses communicate to
However, specific facts about particulars are not

nearly so important as the generalizations derived from
them.

The process of empirical generalization is commonly

known as induction.

The source of justification in making

empirical generalizations comes from the uniformity which
exists in nature.
Chapter IV was used to analyze certain arguments which
tended to make two sources of knowledge less effective.

The

logical positivists questioned the existence of synthetic a
priori knowledge.

These positivists believed that only

analytic a priori and empirical knowledge exists.

While

these people attempted to disprove the various instances of
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supposed a priori knowledge# some question remains as to
whether they were successful.
The major point of contention with a posteriori know
ledge and induction occurs in the question of universal
causation.

The law of universal causation is the basis for

induction.

Hume believes that individual acceptance of the

law is nothing more than habit.

The law apparently can not

be justified through induction.

Uncertainty in this area

limits the effectiveness of induction .as a source of know
ledge .
Absolute certainty about a useful source of knowledge
does not seem to exist.

Since certainty is a requirement

in the explanan of an effort at scientific explanation# the
definition is meaningful only as a way of understanding the
idealized process.

However, the requirements of "theory"

are not so restrictive.

The distinction between the two was

made to illustrate the importance of establishing the
soundest possible epistemology in the development of
marketing theory.
For epistemology to play its part in theory development#
the individuals in marketing# most likely to develop theory#
must be aware of its role.

The chapters which follow are

the results of an attempt to discover the awareness of
marketing scholars.

This attempt was an empirical investi

gation made among marketing professors that were members of

the American Marketing Association.

CHAPTER V

A HISTORICAL SKETCH OP RESPONDENTS

The purpose of this chapter is to provide insight into
the nature of the people that responded to the mail survey.
This intent is accomplished by analyzing the historical
information provided in the questionnaire.

Tabular presen

tations and analysis are also made of certain cross-classi
fied historical data.
This chapter is important in establishing the closeness
of the respondents to an ideal population.

The ideal popula

tion was described in Chapter I as containing "all of those
persons that shall be formulating or teaching marketing
theory sometime in the near future."1

This population is

selected as the ideal because it is the one that epistemology
can most benefit.

The first subhypothesis states that "one

criteria for judging a better approach to develop marketing
theories is the degree to which marketing theorists understand
the problems of epistemology.

^■Chapter I . p. 15.
^Chapter I. p. 3 .
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The ideal population
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represents what is meant by "marketing theorist" in this
subhypothesis.

However, the impossibility of knowing who

fits into the ideal population presents a problem.

This

problem was solved by substituting the academic members of
the American Marketing Association for the ideal.^

This

chapter is used to examine the degree of substitutability
between the two groups.

However, such an analysis can only

be speculative since the members of the ideal group cannot
be known.
A historical sketch of the respondents is also impor
tant in analyzing the answers given.

The background of the

respondents may reasonably be expected to affect their re
action to the questions.

Thus, the sketch presented in this

chapter is the groundwork necessary for the analysis of other
questions.

RELATION TO EMPLOYING INSTITUTION

A minimum amount of information was requested about the
employing institution of the respondents.

An effort was

maintained to keep the returns as anonymous as possible.
This attempt at anonymity was promised in both the cover
letter and the introduction to the questionnaire.4

^Note the discussion in Chapter I.
^Appendix A and B.

pp. 15-21.

A direct
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request for the name of the employing institution was
judged to be construed as a violation of that promise.

The

only information requested was whether the institution is
public (state or municipal) or private.

Out of 124 respon

dents , one (0.8%) did not answer the question, 86 (69.4%)
answered that they were employed by a public institution
and 37 (29.8%) stated that they were employed by a private
institution.5
All 124 respondents replied to the question which re
quested their academic rank.

The following table is a

presentation of the results of the answers.

Table 5.1
Academic Rank of Respondents

Academic Rank
Instructor
Assistant Professor
Associate Professor
Professor
Other
Source:

Number
1
22
37
62
2

Percent
0.8
17.8
29.8
50.0
1.6

Appendix A

Several reasons may exist for the large percentage of
full professors that were respondents.

5Appendix A.

First, an individual
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may speculate that as a professor becomes academicly estab
lished, he is more likely to be interested in organizations
like the American Marketing Association (A.M.A.) .

If a

greater percentage of the full professors in marketing are
members in A.M.A. than for other levels, they are more likely
to appear as respondents.

Second, a person may also specu

late that full professors are somewhat more interested in
helping graduate students than those who are still climbing
the ladder.

If this speculation is true, full professors

are more likely to have answered the questionnaire than others.
Third, the full professors may have been less cynical and
less generally critical about this study.
The high proportion of full and associate professors
indicates that the respondents are at least in positions
where theory may be taught and developed.

Theory courses

in marketing often appear on the graduate level of univer
sity curriculums.

A high proportion of senior faculty mem

bers seems to be favorable in estimating the ideal
population.

ACADEMIC CONSIDERATIONS

The relationship between the institutions which confer
red existing academic honors and the respondents was deemed
important in establishing background factors of those people
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that returned the questionnaire.

The background factors

are presented in an effort to aid analysis of future ques
tions and to establish a relationship with the ideal
population.

Highest Level of Academic Achievement
The 124 respondents all answered the question pertain
ing to level of achievement, and all of them indicated that
they held at least a Master's degree.

The following table

is used to present the results.

Table 5.2
Highest Academic Achievement

Level of Achievement

Masters
All But Doctorate
Doctorate
Other
Source:

Number

10
16
97
1

Percent

8.1
12.9
78.2
0.8

Appendix A

Several reasons may be given as to why such a large
percentage of respondents have their doctorate degrees.
Table 5.1 contains figures which indicate that 79.8% of the
respondents had an academic rank of associate or full
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professor, and most of these people may be expected to have
their doctorates.

The same speculations that applied to the

large number of full professors also may be used as reasons
for the large percentage of respondents with doctorates.
The high percentage of doctorates appears to be desir
able in light of the ideal population requirements.

The

doctorate degree requires a certain contact with research
and with methodology that may not be present in the other
levels of achievement.

Institution Conferring Level of Attainment
In group the various institutions into meaningful
combinations, athletic conferences with some minor alterna
tions were used.

These combinations were chosen because

theyaare reasonably well known, and because they appear to
represent similar academic attitudes in addition to athle
tics.

The results of this grouping follow.

Table 5.3
Institution Conferring Highest
Level of Attainment

Conferring Institutions
No Response
Ivy League
Big Ten

Number

Percent

3
20
44

2.4
16.1
35.6
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Table 5.3 (Continued)

Conferring Institutions
Southeastern Conference^
Southwestern Conference
Big Eight & Western Athletic
Pacific Coast
Southern
Major Independent^
Other
Source:

Number
6
7
7
10
1
14
12

Percent
4.8
5.6
5.6
8.1
0.8
11.3
9.7

Appendix A

♦Includes Florida State University
♦♦includes: Syracuse, University of Chicago, New
York University, M.I.T., and Penn State
University.

The primary significance of the above table is that the
large majority of the respondents were from reasonably large,
major institutions.

Also, over fifty percent attained their

levels from ivy League or Big Ten schools.

The few major

independent universities contained the third largest number
of respondents.

The reasons for the nature of this distribu

tion lie to a large extent, in the number of doctorates
awarded by these institutions.

For the twelve years of

1947-1958 inclusive. Big Ten and Ivy League schools granted
60.9% of the doctorates in business that were granted by
S. universities.6

This figure compares favorably with the

Calculated from figures in: Robert A. Gordon and
James E. Howell, Higher Education for Business, New York:

U.

51.7% of the respondents who received degrees from these
schools.

Also, during the same period, the major indepen

dent universities graduated 20.3% of the doctorates in
business, which again compares favorably with the 11.3% of
respondents from these schools.7

Of the top thirteen uni

versities in the number of doctorates granted, ten were Ivy
League or Big Ten schools, while two of the other three were
Major Independents.8

However, no conclusion can be drawn

from these figures about how the results aid in building the
background for analysis of other questions.

Major Area of Study
The respondents were quizzed about the major area of
their studies in the above institutions.

All of those people

that returned the questionnaire answered the question.

The

results were broken into three groups and are presented in
the following table.

Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 398.
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Table 5.4
Major Area of Study

Major Area

Number
63
38
23

Marketing
Economics
Other
Source:

Percent
50.9
30.6
18.5

Appendix A

PERSONAL DATA

Certain aspects of the personal background of respon
dents was deemed as having possible value.

At the least,

this information provides some further insight into the nature
of the respondents.

The personal information includes age,

years as full-time teacher, and two major areas of academic
interest.

Age
The ageB of the respondents were grouped in sets of
five years.

No respondent was found to be twenty-five or

less, and none was found to be greater than seventy-five
years old.
Further calculations on age were performed.

The mean

age of all respondents, using individual ages rather than
groupings, was found to be 45.6 years.

The conclusion is
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that the age of the respondents was reasonably well dis
persed (standard deviation = 10.0 years), and that the
majority of the ages were between 35 and 55 years.

Table 5.5
Age of Respondent

Inclusive
Age Grouping
No Response
26 - 30
31-35
36 - 40
41 - 45
46 - 50
51 - 55
56 - 60
61 - 65
66 - 70
71 - 75
Source:

Number

1
8
13
21
18
28
14
13
3
4
1

Percent

0.8
6.4
10.5
16.9
14.5
22.7
11.3
10.5
2.4
3.2
0.8

Appendix A

Years as. Eul1-Time Teacher
The respondents were also requested to supply the num
ber of years in which they had been employed as a full-time
teacher.

The answers were grouped in units of five years

for tabular presentation.

No respondent had been teaching

for more than forty years.
Further calculations on individual, ungrouped responses
indicated that the mean years taught was 14.0, and the
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standard deviation was 9.2 years.

These figures indicate

that a reasonably wide span of teaching experience existed
(standard deviation « 9.2 years), and that the majority of
the respondents had from five to twenty-three years full
time teaching experience.

Table 5.6
Years as Full-Time Teacher

Inclusive
Years

Number

No Response
1 - 5
6-10
11 - 15
21 - 25
26 - 30
31 - 35
36 - 40

4
31
23
18
19
3
1
5

Source:

Percent
3.2
25.1
18.6
14.5
15.3
2.4
0.8
4.0

Appendix A .

Interest in Theory and Research
The respondents were requested to list two areas in
marketing that interested them most.

The answers received

were grouped into theory, research, both theory and research,
and other.
By the nature of the question, no judgment could be
made on the interest in theory pertaining to the "other" areas.
For example, the respondent may have answered "retailing" and

130
"consumer behavior" to this question.
response is classified as "other."

In that case, the

Nevertheless, the res

pondent may have been keenly interested in both retailing
theory and consumer behavior theory.

Unless theory was

specifically mentioned as one of the two marketing interests
of the respondent, that classification was not used.

Table 5.7
Respondent Interest in Theory and Research

Area of Interest
No Response
Theory
Research
Both Theory and Research
Other
Source:

Number
3
10
38
3
70

Percent
2.4
8.1
30.6
2.4
56.5

Appendix A .

Research was included as a separate classification be
cause of the important role it plays in developing marketing
theory.
theorist.

Any marketing researcher is a potential marketing
The three categories that represent stated inter

est in marketing theory or research contains 41.1% of the
total respondents.

The total group of respondents appear at

least compatible with the ideal population.
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STUDY OP METHODOLOGY

Questions 11 and 111 of the questionnaire (Appendix A)
quizzed the respondents on whether they had studied method
ology formally or informally.

Of considerable importance in

the direct approach used for these questions is the fact
that no definition was given to the term "methodology."

The

only attempt at definition was the use of the descriptive
phrases "role of methodology in developing theory" and
"philosophical viewpoints on methodology."
tion was largely left to the respondent.

The interpreta
Undoubtably, this

interpretation varied greatly among those that answered the
questions.

Still, the answers give some insight into

whether the respondents view themselves as being versed in
what they understand to be methodology.

Formal In-Depth Study of Methodology
This answer required a yes or no response.

Thus, those

persons that answered the question had to define both "indepth" and "methodology" to their own satisfaction.

Formal

study was defined in the question as meaning that which oc
curred in the classroom.
question.

All respondents answered the

Table 5.8
Formal In-Depth Study of Methodology

Number

Response
Yes
No
Source:

57
67

Percent
46.0
54.0

Appendix A.

Informal Study of Methodology
To answer this question the respondent was required to
define both philosophical viewpoints and methodology to his
satisfaction.

Again, a yes or no response was required.

In

formal study was defined in the question as meaning outside
the classroom.

Table 5.9
Informal Study of Methodology

Response
Yes
No
Source:

Number

Percent

94
30

75.8
24.2

Appendix A.

An interesting insight into the type of respondent is
that, the large majority of them claim some understanding of
methodology.

The source of this understanding may be formal
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or informal, but most of these people believe they possess
a reasonable understanding of methodology.

STUDY OP METHODOLOGY COMPARED TO INTEREST
AND TRAINING

This section is used to investigate the type of people
that claimed to have studied methodology either formally or
informally.

Those cross-classifications of study in method

ology with other historical elements are used to aid under
standing of the respondent's background.

Other possible

combinations are omitted.
In the following tables "formal11 is intended to mean
formal in-depth study of the role of methodology in develop
ing theory.

Similarly, "informal" is intended to mean in

formal study of the philosophical viewpoints on methodology.
This tabular format is continued throughout the section in
order to provide maximum readability.

Study in Methodology and Academic Rank
The following table is a presentation of the results
of this cross-classification.
The sharp percentage decrease in formal methodological
training when moving from assistant professor to full
professor tends to indicate increasing interest in the sub
ject as taught in universities.

An interesting insight is
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gained into the respondents by considering that a large
portion of those who had no formal training claim to have
studied methodology informally.

The following section adds

support to the concept of increased academic interest in
methodology.

Table 5.10

Study in Methodology and Academic Hank

Rank

Informal

Formal
Number

Assistant
Professor
Associate
Professor
Pull
Professor
Source:

Yes
Percent

Mo
Num Per
ber
cent

Yes
Num Per
cent
ber

No
Num
ber

Per
cent

14

63.6

8

36.4

15

68.2

7

31.8

18

48.6

19

51.4

29

78.4

8

21.6

22

35.5

40

64.5

47

75.8

15

24.2

Appendix A .

Study in Methodology and Teaching Experience
This tabular presentation, is used to support the prior
one in the speculation that academic interest in methodology
has steadily increased.
If the years as a full-time teacher may be used to ap
proximate roughly the years after degree, the table illustrates
that more recent graduates were exposed to formal study in
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methodology than earlier graduates.

These results concur

with the results of the prior section on academic rank.

The

inference may also be through all categories of full-time
teaching years, the majority of respondents consider them
selves to have informally studied the concepts of methodology.

Table 5.11
Study in Methodology and Years as
Full-Time Teacher

Years as
Full-Time
Teacher
1-5
6 -10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40

Formal
Number
20
12
10
5
5
1
1
1

Source:

Yes
Percent
64.5
52.2
55.6
25.0
26.3
33.3
100.0
20.0

Informal

No
Num Per
cent
ber
11
11
8
15
14
2
0
4

35.5
47.8
44.4
75.0
73.7
66.7
0.0
80.0

Number
22
20
15
13
17
2
1
3

Yes
Percent
71.0
87.0
83.3
65.0
89.5
66.7
100.0
60.0

No
Number

Percent

9
3
3
7
2
1
0
2

29.0
13.0
16.7
35.0
10.5
33.3
0.0
40.0

Appendix A.

Study in Methodology and Major Area of Study
This section provides the basis for comparison between
marketing, economics, and the other areas on the respondents
belief that they have studied methodology.
Little difference is apparent between the three cate
gories listed in Table 5.12.

All three categories are within
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about ten percentage points of each other.

However, when

analyzing the apparent similarities between areas, the con
cept being measured must be kept in mind.

The extent to

which respondents believe they have studied methodology is
what has been measured.

This analysis illustrates the

importance of the definition.

Table 5.12
Study in Methodology and Major Area of Study

Informal

Formal
Major

Yes
Num- Per
ber
cent

Marketing
Economics
Other

29
16
12

Source:

46.0
42.1
52.2

No
Num- Per
ber
cent
34
22
11

54.0
57.9
47.8

Yes
Num Per
ber
cent

No
Num Per
ber
cent

50
26
18

13
12
5

79.4
68.4
78.3

20.6
31.6
21.7

Appendix A. .

Those respondents with extensive training in economics
may have a different understanding of methodology than those
without this training.

Many basic and intermediate economic

theory texts include a discussion of methodology, and this
coverage is not nearly so extensive in marketing.

g

Coverage

9For an example of the coverage of methodology in an
economics text see: C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory,
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1966, pp. 1-8.
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of methodology in marketing texts appears to be limited
mostly to discussions of the scientific method and its ap
plications.10

This type of background difference may have

left the respondents with different views of methodology.

Study in Methodology and Interest in Theory
This presentation is used to analyze the relationship
between those respondents that believe they have studied
methodology and those who are interested in theory find re
search.

Some degree of connection is easy to anticipate.

The analysis provides a check on the anticipated results.

Table 5.13
Study in Methodology and Interest in
Theory and Research

Area of
Interest

Theory
Research
Both
Other
Source:

Formal
NO
Yes
Num Per Nura- Percent
ber
cent ber
6
40.0
60.0
4
50.0
19
50.0 19
1
66.7
33.3
2
28
60.0
40.0 42

Informal
Yes
No
Num Per Num- Perber
cent ber
cent
9
90.0
1
10.0
81.6
18.4
31
7
2
66.7
1
33.3
70.0 21
49
30.0

Appendix-A.

^■°See the discussion in Chapter II of: Harper W. Boyd
and Ralph Westfall, Marketing Research, revised edition,
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D . Irwin, 1964, pp. 40-49.
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The figures may be. used to support the anticipated
results, but a large percentage of respondents interested
in theory and research seem to feel that they had no formal
training in methodology.

However, a very high percentage

of respondents interested in theory and research believe
that they have remedied the lack through informal training.
Also, the formal training percentages for theory and research
were somewhat higher than the percentage for other areas.

SUMMARY OP ANALYSIS

The goal of this chapter was to provide background in
formation on the nature of the respondents and attempt to
establish the relation between this group and the ideal popu
lation.

To accomplish this goal, the historical data col

lected through a questionnaire survey (Appendix A and B)
was presented and analyzed.

Besides the analysis of basic

data, cross-classifications between whether the respondents
felt they had studied methodology and various historical
information were presented.
The first major grouping of historical data that was
analyzed dealt with the institutions which employed the res
pondents.

About 70% of the respondents were employed by

public institutions.

Also, those people that returned the
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questionnaire were largely at the higher levels of academic
employment.

Fifty percent were full professors.

This

characteristic fits well into the image of an ideal popu
lation.
Another classification which adds insight into the
background of the respondents is their relation to the in
stitution that granted the highest degree or present aca
demic achievement.

The large majority of persons that

answered the questionnaire received their standing from re
latively large major universities.

The Big Ten and Ivy League

schools had the largest representation among the returns.
The majors of the respondents, while they were working toward
their highest degree, were largely divided between marketing
and economics (81.5%) with a little over thirty percent being
trained in economics.
Considerable personal data was also collected by the
respondents.

The average age was 45.6 with a standard devi

ation of 10.0 years.

Further, the respondents said that they

had been full-time teachers for an average of 14.0 years.with
a standard deviation of 9.2 years.

In all, both ages and

years teaching experience were well dispersed around the
respective means.

Also, forty-one percent of the respondents

stated interest in marketing theory and/or marketing research.
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The respondents were quizzed relative to whether they
had studied methodology either formally or informally.

The

definition of methodology was left for the individual to
devise.

The purpose of this omission was to determine the

extent to which these people felt trained in methodology.
The result was that forty-six percent of the respondents
said they had formal training, but seventy-five percent said
that they had informally studied methodology.
Four cross-classifications between whether respondents
felt that they had studied methodology and other elements of
the historical data were presented in the.chapter.

Classifi

cation with academic rank and with years as a full-time
teacher revealed that the people furtherest away from their
present degree or standing had less formal training in
methodology.

These results seem to indicate that a steady

increase in formal methodological training has occurred over
the past thirty or forty, years.

Also, those people interested

in theory and/or research only indicated slightly more train
ing in methodology than others.
Certain generalizations may be drawn from the data
presented in this chapter.

Broadly speaking, the respondents

were highly educated middle-aged people with a reasonably
lengthy amount of teaching experience.

These respondents

appear to correspond fairly well with the characteristics

that may be expected to be part of the ideal population.
The chapter which follows is used to examine the answers
given by these respondents to questions about methodology.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the degree
of understanding among marketing scholars concerning the role
of epistemology in developing marketing theory.

The pre

ceding chapters have established that knowledge of episte
mology may aid the marketing scientist in developing theory.
The primary hypothesis states that “a better approach to de
veloping marketing theory can be produced.1'

The supposed

reason that a better approach can be produced is because
marketing scholars do not have an in-depth understanding of
epistemology.

The empirical analysis which follows is an

attempt to determine the truth or falsity of this assumption.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the method of
analysis.

The next section is a discussion of the measurement

of epistemological understanding by marketing scholars.

The

third section involves an effort at determining the degree to
which the existing body of marketing thought is theoretical.
The fourth section is an inquiry into differences in answers
which occurred between selected respondent characteristics.
142
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METHOD OP ANALYSIS

This section contains the methods used for determining
the facts necessary to the purpose of this chapter.

The ana

lysis used to determine the measurement of understanding and
the degree to which marketing is theoretical are discussed in
this section.

The section also examines methods for cross-

classifying the respondents personal data with the data used
for analysis.

Methodology for Measuring Understanding
Three approaches were used in determining understanding.
The approaches required respondents to analyze two passages,
tested respondent recognition of a posteriori problems, and
located the respondents' favored source of knowledge.
Methodology for Analysis of Two Passages;

In order to

determine understanding of the two sources of knowledge, the
respondents were requested to read a passage and classify it
relative to "the fundamental method(s) of developing theory
that it implies.”1

For each of these passages, the same ten

possible responses were given.

These responses were:

intui

tive insight, logic, empirical research, self-evident truth

^Questions V and VI, Appendix A.
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or fact, experience, none of these to a significant degree,
all of these, methodology and theory are not appropriate
t

topics for the field of marketing, don*t know, and other.
Any combination of the ten possible responses may have been
selected.

Distribution percentages were based on the total

number of responses.
and multiple answers.

No distinction,was made between single
Only two respondents did not answer the

questions on these passages.
For the a priori passage, intuitive insight and selfevident truth or fact are acceptable responses because they
represent an a priori source of knowledge.

This passage ad

vocates the use of a priori knowledge in developing the
sciences of human action and thereby supports these two ans
wers as acceptable.2

Logic is not implied as a fundamental

method for developing theory by the passage and is not a
suitable answer.

Empirical research and experience both

connote an a posteriori rather than an a priori approach and
are not acceptable answers.
The author of the a posteriori passage uses the observ
ed occurrence of phenomena (a posteriori knowledge) to

2This passage appears as question V in Appendix A, and
it is taken from: Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological Problems
of Economics, New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1960, p. 130.
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establish the criteria for cause and effect.3

Also, the

passage advocates the existence of universal causation with
in its framework for establishing a cause-effect relationship.
The clues in this passage are not as obvious as those used in
the a priori passage.

That passage amounted to a definition

of a priori knowledge.

This passage is an example of using

a posteriori knowledge, and it provides another clue in ad
vocating the existence of universal causation.
Both empirical research and experience are acceptable
responses for the a posteriori passage, since they are both
directly related to a posteriori knowledge.

Logic is not a

suitable response because it is not advocated as a fundamen
tal method for developing theory in the passage.

The other

potential responses, intuitive insight and self-evident truth
or fact, are a priori and are not acceptable answers.
Methodology for Respondent Recognition of A Posteriori
Problems:

In order to further determine the extent to which

marketing scholars understand the nature and problems of a
posteriori knowledge, these scholars were requested to
identify possible legitimate, philosophical objections to a

This passage appears as Question VI in Appendix T\t,
and it is taken from: John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic,
New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1961, p. 256. The
passage is one of Mill's canons which are attempts at es
tablishing rules for determining cause and effect.
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hypothetical passage.^

The passage suggests that a problem

may exist in predicting that the sun will rise tomorrow
purely on the basis of historical evidence (a posteriori
knowledge).

The potential responses are stated as objections

or possible problems, and the first three objections are true.
The first objection is that historical data cannot be mean
ingfully extrapolated into the future.

The controversy over

universal causation and uniformity in nature applies directly
to this objection.

The second possible objection states that

no hypothesis can be totally verified through empiricism.
This objection also has ties with the problems of universal
causation and uniformity in nature, but the connection is
somewhat more abstract than the first objection.

The third

objection stated that the sunrise prediction should be prob
abilistic.

Since the possibility exists that an action with

in the bounds of the laws of nature may cause the sun not to
rise tomorrow, the objection is sound.
responses are all false.

The remaining five

The fourth objection states that

the example is a case of pure deductive reasoning, but the
example is more a case of pure inductive reasoning.

With

respect to the fifth response, which states that ultimate

4See Question VIII, Appendix A.
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truths are the only valid criteria for turth, even those
people that firmly believe in a priori knowledge accept the
existence of a posteriori knowledge.

The sixth objection

states that the use of logic requires other than empirical
sources of information, but logic is disjunct from the vari
ous epistemologies and its use is not necessarily related
to any epistemology.

The seventh objection is also false,

because of the accepted existence of a posteriori knowledge.
Finally, the eighth objection is false because application
of an empirical approach is pragmatic as was discussed in
Chapter IV.

Certain key words such as "only" in the fifth

objection and "all" in the seventh may have given away the
correct answers.
Respondents’ Favored Sources of Knowledge:

Some in

sight into the epistemological understanding of respondents
was gathered by requesting that they rate the importance of
five elements for developing marketing theory.5

These ele

ments were the same ones used in the first two passages.
Therefore, two of the elements were a priori in nature and
two others were a posteriori in nature.

The fifth item was

"logic" which is neutral with respect to the sources of

5See Question VII, Appendix A.
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knowledge.

Each of these elements was to be assigned a num

ber from one to five indicating its importance relative to
the other four.

The most important element received a one,

the second in importance received a two, etc.

The results

were compiled by determining what percentage of first place
votes went to each element, what percentage of second place
votes went to each element, etc.,-for all five places.

The

percentage of non-responses for each place was included in
the results.
In order .to further determine the favored source of
knowledge, the respondent was presented with a complex situ
ation, and he was requested to briefly list the steps used in
attempting to find a solution.6

Again, the responses were

hopefully expected to reveal insight into the respondents1
understanding of epistemology.

The responses were grouped

into the categories of no response, empirical approach, in
tuitive approach, both empirical and intuitive approaches,
and other approaches.

The majority of those persons that did

return the questionnaire did not respond to this question.
Many of those persons which did respond did so in a hap
hazard manner.

Nevertheless, if an approach could reasonably

be classified it was used.

6See Question IX, Appendix A.
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Method for Determining the Percent Theoretical
of Marketing Thought
An attempt was made to establish the degree to which
marketing scholars believe the existing body of marketing
thought is theoretical.

7

Respondents were requested to esti

mate the percent theoretical attained by marketing thought.
This request was made in order to establish how far marketing
scholars believe the field has progressed in developing a
sound body of marketing theory.

If the results indicate only

small progress, then a large potential exists for things such
as epistemology that can aid further development.

If the

results indicate that marketing scholars believe that the
area has already become highly theoretical, little potential
exists for the acceptance of epistemology.

Method for Determining Effect of Selected
Personal Characteris tics
The results presented in this analysis are the product
of cross-classifications of data presented elsewhere in
Chapters V and VI.

The personal characteristics selected for

presentation in this section are collegiate major, interest
in theory or research, and age.

These three were selected be

cause they exhibited the most significant results.

With each

of these personal characteristics, results of this study were
segmented for analysis.

These latter three elements are the

?See Question IV, Appendix A.
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analysis of an a priori passage, the analysis of an a posteri
or passage, and percent to which marketing is theoretical.
These three elements were selected because the cross
classified results were more significant than with other
possible combinations.

MEASUREMENT OF UNDERSTANDING

The following sections are used to measure the epistemological understanding of marketing scholars.
the measurement, five approaches are used.

To accomplish

These five ap

proaches are the analysis of an a priori passage, the analy
sis of a posteriori passage, respondent recognition of a
posteriori problems, respondent rating of approaches for the
development of marketing theory, and the approach for solving
a complex problem by respondents.

Analysis of an A Priori Passage
Table 6.1 contains the percentage responses to the
analysis of the a priori passage.

The heavy selection of

intuitive insight as a response was expected.

This answer

was the most obvious, and it may have been selected by res
pondents with little or no understanding of epistemology.
The primary purpose of offering this response was to give
those people answering the question one obviously correct
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choicer since some answer was expected.

Then, the inclusion

of a second correct response, not quite so obvious, was used
in an attempt to determine if a deeper understanding existed.
As indicated in Table 6.1, the results were not encouraging.
The ideal distribution of responses has 50.0% intuitive in
sight and 50.0% self-evident truth or fact.

The low response

for self-evident truth or fact indicates some lack of epistemological understanding about a priori knowledge on the part
of marketing scholars.

It is also interesting to note that

27.9% of the respondents picked empirical research and experi
ence.

These two answers are related to a posteriori knowledge

and indicate confusion by the respondents.

Also, almost 3%

did not think any answer applied.

Table 6.1
Analysis of an A Priori Passage
Overall
Distribution
Possible
Responses
Intuitive Insight
Logic
Empirical Research
Self-Evident Truth or Pact
Experience
None of These
All of These
Methodology and Theory
Not Apropos for Marketing
D o n 't Know

Percent
47.6
7.5
12.9
3.4
15.0
2.7
4.1
0.0
2.0
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Table 6.1 (Continued

Possible
Responses
Other
TOTAL
Source:

Percent
4.8
100.0
Appendix A.

Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage
The percentage distribution of answers to the respondent's
analysis of an a posteriori passage appears in Table 6.2.

The

sum of the percentage responses for the two correct answers,
empirical research and experience, only accounts for 40.6%
of the total responses.

Conceivably, some of these answers

are little more than guesses, but in any case, some lack of
in-depth understanding of the nature and problems of a poste
riori knowledge is indicated by the results.
The selection of logic as the most favorable responses
was probably because the passage appears "logical" in the
steps it uses to establish the nature of cause and effect.
However, those persons highly familiar with the problems of
empirical generalization may recognize that a flaw exists in
the logic of the passage.

The flaw lies in the inherent

assumption that universal causation is a fact.

If the selec

tion of logic as a response may be assumed to be because of
the logical nature of the passage, then, it is not a
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satisfactory answer.

While only 2.3% of the respondents

confused the passage with the a priori answers intuitive in
sight and self-evident truth or fact, 8.3% answered all of
these, none of these, and don't know.

As before, the overall

performance was not encouraging.

Table 6.2

Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage

Overall
Distribution
Possible
Responses
Intuitive Insight
Logic
Empirical Research
Self-Evident Truth or Fact
Experience
None of These
All of These
Methodology and Theory
Not Apropos for Marketing
Don't Know
Other
TOTAL
Source:

Percent
0.8
39.8
37.6
1.5
3.0
4.5
1.5
0.8
2.3
6.8
100.0
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Respondent Recognition of Epistemological Problems
The results from each of the potential objections to the
example on the sunrise are presented in Table 6.3.
sults from the first four objections were only fair.

The re
The

first two responses were well below fifty percent correct.
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while the third response was only 54.4% correct.

In a pure

guesswork situation, fifty percent correct responses were
expected when only two answers are possible.

These results

tend to indicate a lack of in-depth understanding.

The fourth

response required that the person answering have knowledge of
the difference between deduction and induction.

The proper

response was no, and this answer is easy to detect for anyone
at all familiar with the definition of deduction.

While only

23.8% of the respondents selected the yes answer, an even
lower percent is reasonable to expect from a group of respon
dents that are truly knowledgeable about the processes of
methodology.

Still, some basic understanding is indicated by

the 76.2% who did answer correctly.
The results of the last four potential objections were
much better than the first.
should have been no.

All responses for these questions

These questions were designed to be as

obvious as possible as was response number four.

Key words

such as "only" in the fifth response and "all" in the seventh
response may have given away the proper answer.

Nevertheless,

the overall results from these responses were good.

These

results indicate that some basic understanding does exist.
Apparently, a reasonable groundwork is available, upon which
in-depth understanding may be built.

Table 6.3
Respondent Recognition of Epistemological Problems

Possible Responses
Mere Historical Data Does Not Allow Meaningful Extrapola
1
tion into the Future
2 . No Hypothesis Can Be Totally Verified Through Empiricism
3. The Prediction Should Be Probabilistic
4. The Prediction Is a Case Of Pure Deductive Reasoning
5. Ultimate Truths Are The Only Valid Criteria For
Truth
6 . The Use Of Logic Requires The Application Of Other
Than Empirical Sources of Information
7. The Source Of All Knowledge Is The Obviously True
Constructs Of The Mind
8 . The Above Approach Is Not Pragmatic

.

Source:

Yes
Percent

No
Percent

Totals
Percent

42.3
35.9
54.4
23.8

57.7
64.1
45.6
76.2

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

4.4

95.6

100.0

14.9

85.1

100.0

0.8
0.8

99.2
99.2

100.0
100.0
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Respondent Rating of Approaches for Develop
ment of Marketing Theory
The results of rating five elements v;ith respect to
their importance in developing marketing theory are presented
in Table 6.4

The column in Table 6.4 labeled weighted posi

tion value indicates the relative position of importance for
each of the. five elements.6

From Table 6.4 empirical re

search is rated most important with a 1.96 value followed by
logic and then experience.

Intuitive insight and self-evident

truth are rated close to each other but a poor fourth and
fifth.

From the weighted position values, an a posteriori

inductive approach appears to be the most desirable as rated
by the respondents.

6These values were obtained by first reclassifying per
centage responses without including the no response values.
Second, for each element (e.g., intuitive insight, logic,
etc.), each position (e.g., 1st, 2nd, etc.) was multiplied by
the percentage response as a weighting factor. The sum of the
products for each of the elements is its weighted position
value. The value for intuitive insight is calculated below as
an example.
Weighted
Position
1st
2nd 3rd
4th
5th
Value
intuitive insight
2U74%
9.1% 17.0% 35.9% 28.4%
3.75
These percentages are recalculated without the no response fig
ures. Then, 20.4 percent or 0.204 is multiplied by 1.0 (i.e.,
first place), 9.1 percent or 0.91 is multiplied by 2.0 (i.e.,
second place), and so on for all five places. The sum of these
five products equals 3.75 which is the weighted position value
for intuitive insight.

Table 6.4
Respondent Ratings of Approaches for Development of Marketing Theory

1st
Elements for Rating
Intuitive Insight
Logic
Empirical Research
Self-Evident Truth
Experience
No Response

18.9
18.9
46.7
2.4
5.7
7.4
100.0

TOTALS

Source:

Percent
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2nd

Ratings
3rd

Percent

Percent

8.1
36.2
22.6
8.1
13.7
11.3
100.0

14.5
20.2
16.1
9.7
25.0
14.5
100.0

4th
Percent
26.6
9.7
3.2
11.3
23.4
25.8
100.0

5th
Percent
16.9
3.2
2.4
29.9
7.3
40.3
100.0

Weighted
Position Value
3.75
2.52
.1.96
3.66
3.12
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The no response figures in Table 6.4 also indicate
something about respondents ratings.
fifth positions were not rated.

Often the fourth and

The no response rate in

creases rapidly and continuously from the low of only 7.4%
for first place to the high of 40.3% for fifth place.

In

fact, experience, intuitive insight, and self-evident truth
or fact were often omitted from the rating, which may indi
cate the respondents felt that these elements play no part
in developing marketing theory, .or that they do not under
stand the nature of a priori knowledge.

Approach Used for Solving a Complex Problem
The overall percentage distribution of respondent ap
proaches for solving a complex problem appear in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5
Approaches Used for Solving a Complex Problem

Categories of Approaches
No Response
Empirical Approach
Intuitive Approach
Both Empirical and
Intuitive Approaches
Other Approaches
TOTAL
Source:
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Overall
Distribution
Percent
55.7
36.3
1.6
4.8

1.6
100.0
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This distribution of approaches indicates the importance
of empiricism among those persons that did answer this ques
tion.

As with the previous ranking of approaches, empiricism

was supported to a significantly greater degree than any other
approach or combination of approaches.

But, the high percen

tage of no responses to this question appears to indicate
noninterest, inability, or some of both.

Because of the

generally haphazard manner in which this problem was approach
ed by respondents, few other conclusions are justified.
Some basic understanding of epistemological problems
undoubtably exists on a reasonably large scale among market
ing scholars.

The large selection of intuitive insight

(47.6%) in the a priori passage, the moderate selection of
empirical research (37.6%) in the more difficult a posteriori
passage, and the good responses on the less difficult episte
mological problems in the sunrise example all tend to indicate
that a basic understanding does exist.

Also, a very limited

number of these scholars seem to possess an in-depth under
standing of the problems.

However, while the foundation on

which to build does exist, the overall distribution of indepth understanding among marketing scholars seems to be
centered around a fairly low level.

The lack of in-depth

understanding was indicated throughout the previous discussion.
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The failure to select self-evident truth or fact (3.4%) in
the a priori passage, the failure to select experience

(3.0%)

and the large selection of logic (39.8%) in the a posteriori
passage, the failure to recognize the more difficult episte
mological problems in the sunrise example, and the apparent
disregard for a priori knowledge in problems requiring the
rating of elements are all examples of this lack of in-depth
understanding.

DEGREE TO WHICH MARKETING IS THEORETICAL

The results of respondent analysis of degree to which
marketing is theoretical appear in Table 6.6.

The percent

theoretical groups 21-30 and 31-40 are so close that the most
representative model group is 21-40.

This group contains

just under one-half of the total responses

(49.6%) and also

contains the mean of the distribution (36.1%).

However, the

distribution is skewed toward the lower percent theoretical
values.

Almost all of the responses

fifty percentage points 11-60.

(92.4%) were within the

Also, 82.4% of the responses

were in groups of less than or equal to fifty percent, and
94.1% of the responses were in groups of less than or equal
to sixty percent.

These results indicate that marketing

scholars believe the existing body of marketing thought is

I
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not highly theoretical.

This realization on their part may

make them more receptive to a discussion of epistemology as
a tool that can aid in the development of marketing theory.

Table 6.6
Respondent Analysis of Degree to Which Marketing
is Theoretical

Percent Theoretical
0-10
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
TOTAL
Mean
Source:

Overall
Distribution
Percent
1.7
16.8
26.1
23.5
14.3
11.7
2.5
3.4
100.0
36.1
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SELECTED PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OP RESPONDENTS

The following analysis investigates the effects of dif
ferences in collegiate major, interest in theory or research,
and age on the responses given to some of the previously
analyzed questions.

The purpose of the analysis is to glean

all possible information about the respondents out of the sur
vey and, in the process, search for facts that may aid
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dissemination of information about epistemology.

Analysis

of the data revealed that three previously analyzed questions
produced significant information when cross-classified with
the historical characteristics.

These questions include the

analysis of an a priori passage, the analysis of an a poste
riori passage, and the degree to which marketing is theoreti
cal.

Collegiate Major
The cross-classification of collegiate major with res
ponses to the three questions under consideration produced
some varying results.
sections.

These results are reviewed in three

One section is used forreach of the passages and

the third is, used for the degree to which marketing is
theoretical.
Analysis of an A Priori Passage:

The results of this

cross-classification are presented in Table 6.7

Those res

pondents whose university major was either marketing or
economics seemed to do better than all other majors.

The

percentages of combined correct answers for marketing majors
was 63.5%,for economics majors wds 54.8% and for the other
group was only 34.5%.

However, the improvement to marketing

and economics majors by removal of the other group was small.

The percentage of combined correct answers in the overall
distribution was 51.0%.

Still, these results tend to indi

cate that both the marketing and economics curriculums pro
vide somewhat better backgrounds in methodology than other
related areas.

Table 6.7
Effect of Collegiate Major on Respondent
Analysis of an A Priori Passage

Overall
Distribution
Possible
Responses
Intuitive Insight
Logic
Empirical Research
Self-Evident
Truth or Fact
Experience
None of These
All of These
Methodology and Theory
Not Apropos for
Marketing
Don't Know
Other
TOTAL
Source:

Percent

Collegiate Major
Marketing Economics Other
Percent
Percent
Percent

47.6
7.5
12.9

59.0
7.6
12.1

50.0
9.5
11.9

34.5
6.9
20.7

3.4
15.0
2.7
4.1

4.5
18.2
3.0
3.0

4.8
14.3
2.4
7.1

0.0
13.8
3.4
3.4

0.0
2.0
4.8
100.0

0.0
1.5
6.1
100.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0

0.0
6.9
10.3
100.0
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Also, the people with collegiate majors in marketing
seem to have somewhat better backgrounds in methodology than
those persons with collegiate majors in economics who have
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switched into the area of marketing.

This latter phenomenon

may be due to the difference between age groups and the youth
of marketing as a separate field of study in colleges.

The

section on age grouping later in this chapter indicates that
the younger people did better on this passage than the older
groups.

But the older groups did not have the same opportun

ity to major in marketing as did the younger groups because
of expanding collegiate marketing offerings.

An individual

may speculate that the difference which does exist is due more
to the differences in age groupings than to differences in
collegiate majors.
Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage:

The results of

the cross-classification between collegiate major and res
pondent analysis of an a priori passage are presented in
Table 6.8.

The conclusions drawn from these results do not

concur with those of the a priori passage.

Very little dif

ference is indicated between the marketing, economics, and
the other classification.

The summation of correct responses

for marketing (44.8%) is somewhat higher than those for the
other majors (39.1%), but the difference is small enough that
it may be due to chance.

Also, the difference is more than

equaled in the response "other."

The answer given in this

category were widely dispersed, but several of them indicated
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that the respondent had some epistemological understanding.

Table 6.8
Effect of Collegiate Major on Respondent Analysis
of an A Posteriori Passage

Overall
Distribution
Possible
Responses

Percent

Intuitive Insight
Logic
Empirical Research
Self-Evident
Truth or Fact
Experience
None of These
All of These
Methodology and Theory
Not Apropos for
Marketing
Don't Know
Other
TOTAL
Source:

Collegiate Major
Marketing Economics Othe]
Percent Perceni
Percent

0.8
39.8
37.6

1.6
37.3
40.3

0.0
51.2
34.1

0.0
30.4
39.1

1.5
3.0
4.5
1.5

3.0
4.5
1.5

0.0
2.4
0.0
2.4

0.0
0.0
4.3
0.0

1.5
0.0
3.0
100.0

0.0
2.4
7.3
100.0

0.0
8.7
17.4
100.0

0.8
2.3
6.8
100.0

.
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Proper response to this passage was deemed to require
a greater in-depth understanding of the nature and problems
of epistemology.

The comparison of results of this passage

with the preceding passage appears to indicate that, if
marketing and economics curriculums do produce better back
grounds, the difference does not provide the students with
in-depth understanding.

Degree to Which Marketing is Theoretical;
is a presentation of this cross-classification.

Table 6.9
The results

indicate that some differences exist between groups with
marketing, economics, and all other collegiate majors.

The

difference becomes apparent when the groups are compared for
less than or equal to thirty percent theoretical.

This

grouping contained 37.1% of the marketing majors, 47.2% of
the economics majors, and 61.8% of the all other category.
Considerably more economics and other majors believed the
existing body of marketing thought was thirty percent or less
theoretical than did those with collegiate majors in market
ing.

The large difference is made up in the thirty-one to

fifty percent theoretical bracket.

That bracket contained

45.2% of the marketing majors, 38.9% of the economics majors,
and only 14.3% of the all other category.

Thus, the three

groups were about equalized at less than or equal to fifty
percent.

The difference in the lower ratings by economics

and the all other category is apparent in the mean values
presented in Table 6.9

Interest in Theory or Research
Interest in theory or research was cross-classified with
the same three questions to yield some informative results.
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These results are presented and analyzed in the following
sections.

Table 6.9
Effect of Collegiate Major in Rating the
Theoretical Level of Marketing

Percent
Theoretical
0-10
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
TOTAL
Mean

Collegiate Major
Overall
Distribution Marketing Economics
Other
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
1.7
16.8
26.1
23.5
14.3
11.7
2.5
3.4
100.0
36.1

Source:

1.6
12.9
22.6
27.5
17.7
11.3
3.2
3.2
100.0
38.5

0.0
16.7
30.5
25.0
13.9
U.l
0.0
2.8
100.0
35.8

4.8
28.5
28.5
9.5
4.8
14.3
4.8
4.8
100.0
34.2
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Analysis of an A Priori Passage:

The results of the

cross-classification between interest in theory and respon
dent analysis of an a priori passage are presented in Table
6.10.

This presentation is used as an attempt to find out

whether stated respondent interest in theory or research is
a determinant of epistemological understanding.

Interest in

both of these areas seemed to go along with better responses
than for the group which stated no interest in theory or
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research.

However, within the group interested in theory,

there were no responses selecting self-evident truth or fact.
Since that response was used to indicate in-depth under
standing, the results are still something less than desirable
even among those persons most interested in theory.

Table 6.10
Effect of Interest in Theory or Research
on Analysis of an A Priori Passage

Possible
Responses

Overall
Distribution
Percent

Intuitive Insight: 47.6
7.5
Logic
Empirical Research 12.9
Self-Evident
3.4
Truth or Fact
Experience
15.0
None of These
2.7
All of These
4.1
Methodology and
Theory Not
Apropos for
Marketing
0.0
2 .0.
Don't Know
Other
4.8
TOTAL
100.0
Source:

Interest in Theory or Research
Other
Theory
Research
Percent
Percent
Percent
64.3
0.0
14.3

50.0
8.0
14.0

43.4
8.4
13.3

0.0
14.3
0.0
0.0

4.0
12.0
4.0
4.0

3.6
16.9
2.4
3.6

0.0
0.0
7.1
100.0

0.0
0.0
4.0
100.0

0.0
3.6
4.8
100.0
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Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage;

Table 6.11 repre

sents the results of the cross-classification between interest
in theory and respondent analysis of an a posteriori passage.
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These results seem to indicate that those people who were
interested in either theory or research did not significantly
differ from those people in the other category.

In fact, if

empirical research and experience are considered to be the
correct responses, the total percent correct answers for the
theory group is 42.9%, for research 37.2%, and for the other
group 43.8%.

These results seem to indicate lack of episte-

mological understanding by the groups most effected and
justify the conclusions from the preceding passage.

Table 6.11
Effect of Interest in Theory and Research
on Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage

Overall
Possible
Distribution
Responses
Percent
Intuitive In
sight
0.8
Logic
39.8
Empirical Research
37.6
Self-Evident
Truth or Pact
1.5
Experience
3.0
None of These
4.5
All of These
1.5
Methodology and The
ory Not Apropos for
Marketing
0.8
Don't Know
2.3
Other
6.8
TOTAL
100.0
Source:
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Interest in Theory or Research
Other
Research
Theory
Percem
Percent
Percent
0.0
50.0

0.0
44.2

1.4
38.4

42.9

34.9

39.7

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

2.3
2.3
7.0
2.3

1.4
4.1
4.1
0.0

0.0
0.0
7.1
100.0

2.3
0.0
4.7
100.0

0.0
4.1
6.8
100.0

Degree to Which Marketing is Theoretical:
of this investigation appear in Table 6.12.

The results

An analysis of

the information provided from this cross-classification indi
cates that there is little difference between the group with
stated interest in theory, the one interested in research and
the all other category.

Those differences which do exist

may easily be the result of chance.

Apparently, even those

persons without stated interest in marketing theory recognize
some deficiencies in the existing body of marketing thought.

Table 6.12
Effect of Interest in Theory and Research on
Rating the Theoretical Level of Marketing

Percent
Theoretical
0-10
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
TOTAL
Mean

Overall
Distribution
Percent
1.7
16,8
26.1
23.5
14.3
11.7
2.5
3.4
100.0
36.1

Source: Appendix A

Interest in Theory or Research
Theory
Research
Other
Percent
Percent
Percent
0.0
5.0
0.0
15.4
15.0
17.9
23.1
30.0
25.4
23.1
15.0
27.0
23.1
15.0
13.4
15.4
15.0
9.0
0.0
2.5
3.0
0.0
2.5
4.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
37.1
35.8
37.5
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Age Groupings
The final set of cross-classified information compares
the various age groupings with the same three questions
chosen for comparison in the other parts of this section.
The results of these classifications are presented in the
three sub-sections which follow.
Analysis of an A
to present the results

Priori Passage: Table 6.13 is used
of the cross-classification

and respondent analysis of an
groupings, the younger

a priori passage.

In these age

people appear more aware of

mological problems than the older groups.

betweenage

episte-

Since intuitive

insight and self-evident truth or fact are the correct res
ponses, the total percent of correct responses out of all
responses were 63.0% for the 26-35 years old group, 49.9%
for the 36-45 years old group, 45.0% for the 46-55 years old
group, and only 33.3% for the 56- years old and older group.
Thus, a direct connection between age and acceptable response.
Moreover, the youngest group did by far the best job in se
lecting self-evident truth or fact which was deemed an indi
cation of in-depth understanding.
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Table 6.13
Effect of Age on Analysis of an A Priori Passage

Overall
Distribution 26-35
Years
Possible
Responses

Percent

Intuitive
47.6
Insight
7.5
Logic
Empirical Re
12.9
search
Self-Evident
3.4
Truth or Pact
15.0
Experience
None of These
2.7
4.1
All of These
Methodology and
Theory Not Apropos
for Marketing
0.0
2.0
Don't Know
4.8
Other
100.0
TOTAL
Source:

Percent

Age Groupings
46-55
36-45
Years
Years
Percent

Percent

56 &
Over
Percent

55.6
11.1

45.7
8.3

42.5
5.0

33.3
9.5

7.4

12.5

10.0

33.3 .

7.4
11.1
3.7
0.0

4.2
14.6
2.1
6.3

2.5
25.0
2.5
7.5

0.0
9.5
4.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
3.7
100.0

0.0
2.1
4.2
100.0

0.0
2.5
2.5
100.0

0.0
0.0
9.5
100.0
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Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage:

Table 6.14 is a

presentation of the results of the inquiry combining age and
respondent analysis of an a posteriori passage.

As was the

case with other historical characteristics, differences which
appeared in the a priori classification do not seem to exist
in the a posteriori passage.

The percentage of total correct

173
responses are 48.0% for the 26-35 group, 31.0% for the 36-45
group, 48.8% for the 46-55 group, and 38.1% for the greater
than 55 group.

The apparent trend in the a priori passage

does not exist in this approach.

The conclusion that a lack

of in-depth understanding about epistemology exists among
marketing scholars seems to be reinforced by the analysis of
this cross-classification.

Table 6.14
Effect of Age on Analysis of an A Posteriori
Passage

Overall
Distribution.
Possible
Responses
Percent
Intuitive
Insight
0.8
Logic
39.8
Empirical Re
search
37.6
Self-Evident
1.5
Truth or Fact
3.0
Experience
None of These
4.5
All of These
1.5
Methodology and
Theory not Apropos
0.8
for Marketing
Don't Know
2.3
Other
6.8
Source:
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26-35
Years

Age Groupings
46-55
36-45
Years
Years

Percent

Percent

Percent

56 &
Over
Percent

0.0
40.0

2.4
45.2

0.0
36.6

0.0
42.9

44.0

31.0

48.8

28.6

0.0
4.0
4.0
4.0

4.8
0.0
4.8
2.4

2.4
0.0
2.4
0.0

0.0
9.5
9.5
0.0

0.0
0.0
4.0

2.4
2.4
4.8

0.0
0.0
9.8

0.0
4.8
4.8
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Degree to Which Marketing is Theoretical;

Table 6.15

is a presentation of the results of this classification.

An

examination of the percentages seems to indicate that the
older groups {46 and older) believe that the existing body
of marketing thought is somewhat more theoretical them do
the younger groups (45 and younger).
great, but it does seem to exist.

The difference is not

If this is the case, the

younger doctorates may be somewhat more willing to accept
the aid of epistemology in developing marketing theory.

Table 6.15
Effect of Age on Rating the Theoretical Level
of Marketing

Overall
Distribution
Percent
Theoretical
0-10
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
Mean
Source:

26-35
Years

Age Groupings
36-45
46-55
Years
Years

Percent
1.7
16.8
26.1
23.5
14.3
11.7
2.5
3.4

Percent
5.0
20.0
25.0
25.0
5.0
15.0
0.0
5.0

Percent
0.0
27.8
25.0
27.8
11.1
5.6
2.7
0.0

Percent
0.0
9.5
28.6
21.4
16.7
16.7
4.7
2.4

36.1

35.0

32.5

40.3

Appendix A

56 &
Over
Percent
4.8
9.5
23.8
19.1
23.8
9.5
0.0
9.5
40.0
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SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter was to establish the degree
of understanding.among marketing scholars on the role of
epistemology in developing marketing theory.

The nature of

the task and the method of attempting solution limit the pos
sible results to broad generalizations about those scholars
that returned the questionnaire.

Any attempt to be more

specific requires that this investigator go beyond the bounds
of his data.

However, establishing broad generalizations about

the epistemological understanding of marketing scholars is the
goal of the primary research in this study.
To accomplish the purpose of this chapter, the empirical
investigation confronted the marketing scholars with several
problems.

First, those scholars were requested to identify

specific characteristics relative to an a priori and a poste
riori passage.

Generally, some basic understanding was ex

hibited through this request, but a severe lack of in-depth
understanding seemed to exist.

Second, the ability to recog

nize the specific problems of an a posteriori approach was
tested.

Third, two methods were used to have the respondents

rate the two sources of knowledge.

The results indicated

that a strong bias existed in favor of an empirical approach
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over, and perhaps to the exclusion of, an intuitive approach.
In addition to the above attempts at determining under
standing, the respondents were requested to give their beliefs
on the degree to which existing marketing thought is theo
retical.

The results indicated that they believed a fairly

low average exists (36.1%).
toward the lower percentages.

Also, the distribution was skewed
One possible speculation from

these figures is that the low belief on the degree to which
marketing is theoretical may aid acceptance of any proven
tool that can assist in developing sound theory.
In a final attempt to glean all possible information
from the data, certain personal characteristics were cross
classified with three of the previously mentioned approaches.
Basically, the results agreed with previous findings and
tended to firmly back the conclusions drawn from them.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY OP CONCLUSIONS

The purpose o£ this chapter is to summarize the con
clusions of exceptional importance which have been examined
in this dissertation.

The method used in developing this

summary is to comment on how the various conclusions apply
to the hypotheses.

The three subhypotheses and the primary

hypothesis were set forth as the goals of this study, and
the intent of this chapter is to succinctly discuss them
relative to the findings which are spread throughout the
six previous chapters.

The conclusions pertaining to each

subhypothesis are discussed as a major section of this
chapter.

One major section is also used to discuss the se

lection of an epistemology.

The last major section deals

with the application of conclusions in this study.

SUBHYPOTHESIS 1: ONE BETTER APPROACH TO MARKETING
THEORY DEPENDS ON EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING

In judging an approach for analyzing the epistemology
used for development of marketing theory, several things may
be considered.

The first subhypothesis states that one
t
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criterion for judging a better approach for developing mar
keting theories is the degree to which marketing theorists
understand the problems of epistemology.^

This section is

used to examine the conclusions which effect that hypo
thesis.

The method used to accomplish that examination is

to first analyze the value of epistemology in developing
marketing theory.

The discussion of value involves an analy

sis of four problems and a discussion of the desirability of
science in marketing.

The second part of the method used to

examine the conclusions which affect subhypothesis one in
volves ah analysis of the level of epistemological under
standing.

Value of Epistemology in Developing Marketing
Theory
Subhypothesis one indicates that epistemology has value
in developing marketing theory.

Then, an important question

related to this hypothesis is whether, in fact, this value
does exist.

If this value does exist, epistemology can be

come a major aid to the marketing theorist.
Value was defined as a combination of efficiency and
desirability.

Then, the value of epistemology is the

■^Chapter I, p. 3.
2Chapter II, p. 27.
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effectiveness it can exhibit in aiding the development of
marketing theory and the desirability of developing market-*
ing theory.

Epistemology was determined to be something

less than a panacea for the development of science in mar
keting, but it was determined to be a potentially valuable
aid.

Scholarly efforts in epistemology are directed in

search for the nature and criterion of truth.

But science

was briefly defined as a body of truths, and scientists have
devoted their efforts to discovering truths or developing
theories about truths.

A sound epistemology is a court to

which scientists may bring their theories in order to test
them for validity.
Several serious problems must be overcome if science
in marketing is to become a reality.

These problems are an

important aspect of the efficiency with which epistemology
can aid the development of science in marketing.

If the

problems are significant enough to prevent marketing from
becoming a science, there is little that epistemology can do
to advance the field.
Predictability of Human Behavior;

One problem of major

importance to the marketing man in his guest for science in

3Chapter II, pp. 31-32.

180
marketing is the degree of predictability which exists in
human behavior.^

Can the marketing scientist assume that

universal causation applies to man in the same manner that
he assumes it applies to the physical universe?

If the

scientist does not make that assumption, an opportunity for
predicting human behavior is lost.

The solution to this

dilemma is for the marketing scientist to, first, make
every effort to determine the degree to which man's behavi
or is caused and thereby predictable.

Second, to the ex

tent that man's behavior is not caused, the predictions of
the marketing scientist must be considered as only probable
(e.g., subject to chance).

The solution is less than

totally satisfactory, but it does allow the development of
an extensive science in marketing.
Inability to Conduct Controlled Experimentsi

Another

problem lies with the inability of marketing scientists to
c

conduct precisely controlled experiments.

This inability

exists because the marketing scientist can not precisely
control human action, because the e ^ e r i m e n t becomes, a social
variable, and because experiment repetition is not possible.
Fortunately, however, controlled experimentation is not an
absolute necessity to the development of science in marketing.

^Chapter II, pp. 32-34.
5Chapter II, pp. 34-37.
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Also, many alternatives are available to the marketing
scientist which provide an adequate substitute to controlled
experimentation.
Problem of Value-Oriented Bias:

A problem with value-

oriented bias is part of the development of science in mar
keting.^

Basically, the problem is a skepticism as to

whether normative or value-oriented judgements can be elim
inated from scientific efforts in marketing.

Some inclueion

of normative judgements into marketing investigations les
sens the scientific nature of the study, but if marketing
scientists strive to be as positive as possible, the effect
is not significant.
Problem with Cultural Differences:

One final problem

of special importance to marketing theorists is the multi
cultural nature of the world's population.7
determined differences

Culturally

among people delimits the

of generalization on human behavior.

possibility

However, highly ab

stract theory may be derived which is transcultural in nature.
Transcultural theories concentrate on the similarities be
tween cultures rather than differences which may exist.
None of these problems appear to be insurmountable.

The ef

ficiency of epistemology may then be summarized as being less

6Chapter II, pp.

40-42.

7Chapter II, pp.

42-44.
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than totally effective but still a potentially desirable aid.
Desirability of Science in Marketing;

The question of

desirability of science in marketing produces a normative
question of value judgement.8 The answer to the question
must be determined either overtly or covertly to establish
the value of epistemology.

If the development of science in

marketing is not considered desirable, then no matter how
efficient it is, there is no positive value to be gained from
its development.

In fact, if science in marketing is de

veloped in spite of its undesirability, the act may be of
negative value.

However, the answer to the question of de

sirability must be the judgement of the majority of marketing
scholars and consumers as a whole.

This situation exists

because they are both subjected to the benefits and valueoriented problems which are derived from the development of
science in marketing.
One judgement already given, which may be considered
as an initial answer to this question, lies in the existing
trend of marketing thought.

Marketing men and consumers have

largely accepted the movement toward science in marketing.
To this point, then, the question on the desirability of
science in marketing may be answered with the observation

8Chapter II, pp. 44-47.
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that it has so far been deemed desirable.

The future may

yet produce another determination, but given existing con
ditions it seems reasonable to go ahead with the efforts at
developing better marketing theory.
Since epistemology was determined to be both efficient
and desirable in developing marketing theory, it also posses
ses value according to the prior definition of that term.
The existence of this value indicates that a better under
standing of epistemology by marketing scholars can produce
a better approach to developing marketing theory.

The ex

tent of this better approach depends upon the existing level
of knowledge among marketing scholars.

Level of Epistemological Understanding
An empirical investigation was conducted in an effort
to determine the extent of epistemological understanding
among marketing scholars.

g

An ancillary goal of this primary

investigation was to determine the extent to which the exist
ing body of marketing thought was believed to be theoretical.
This secondary goal provides insight into the potential ac
ceptability of epistemology as an aid in developing marketing
theory.

q

See Appendices A and B.
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The extent of epistemological understanding was found
to be less than what might be desirable.10

The degree of

understanding exhibited by respondents to the empirical
study was judged relative to previously determined standards.
The standards included the ability to identify specific
characteristics with respect to an a priori and an a poste
riori passage, the ability to recognize specific problems
of an a posteriori approach, and the ability to properly rate
the two sources of knowledge as a basis for developing
marketing theory.

The results from the passages and the

recognition of a posteriori problems showed some basic under
standing of epistemology, but a severe lack of in-depth know
ledge in the area.11

in the analysis of an a priori passage,

47.6% of the total responses were replies to the most obvious
of the two correct answers.

However, in that same passage,

only 3.4% of the total responses were replies to the less
obvious correct answer.

The ideal split of responses is a

50%-50% division between the two correct answers.

Also,

empiricism was selected as a supremely favorite source of
knowledge, even to the exclusion of intuitive insight.12

10Chapter VI, pp. 150-158.
11Chapter VI, pp. 165-168.
12Chapter VI, pp. 169-170.

in
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the direct respondent ratings of five elements with respect
to the element's importance in developing marketing theory,
the results were significant.

A weighted position value was

calculated as a cardinal measure of the importance of each
elements

The two empirically connected items ranked well

above the two intuitive elements (Empirical Research = 1.96,
Logic = 2.52, Experience = 3.12, Self-Evident Truth = 3.66,
Intuitive Insight = 3.75).

This apparent lack of understand

ing tends to give credence to the first subhypothesis.

A

better approach to the development of marketing theory does
seem possible if marketing scholars arm themselves with a
better understanding of the problems of epistemology.
The results of the secondary effort also provided in
formation.

The degree to which the existing body of market

ing thought is believed to be theoretical was determined to
be fairly low (mean percent theoretical = 36.1%).

Perhaps

this low level can be interpreted as indicating that market
ing scholars may be willing to accept a proven aid in their
attempts at developing marketing theory.
SUBHYPOTHESIS 2: A HIGH LEVEL OP SCIENCE IN
MARKETING REQUIRES AN ACCEPTED EPISTEMOLOGY

Within the physical sciences or well developed social
sciences, a succinct, generally accepted view on how to
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formulate theory usually exists.13

Acceptable methodology

for theory development is firmly established.
tion does not exist for marketing.

This situa

The marketing scientist

that devises a theory has automatically selected an epistemology.

However, that epistemology may not be consciously

known, or it may be completely misunderstood.

The result

of this situation is a higher probability of methodological
errors in marketing theory formulation, lack of elaboration
about the source of knowledge for given theories and because
of this inadequate information on the source of knowledge,
confusion about the validity of some theories.
Subhypothesis two state.? that if marketing is to be
come highly scientific, marketing scholars must develop the
requirements for an accepted epistemology.14

The value of

epistemology to the development of science in marketing was
previously determined to be related to the efficiency of
this tool and the desirability of establishing a science.15
The results were that epistemology can be a valuable aid to
marketing theorists.

While good theory may be developed

13Chapter I, pp. 3-4.
14

^Chapter I, p. 3.

15Chapter II, pp.

182-183.
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without proper methodology, the establishment of "a con
nected and systematized body of truth," in any highly de
veloped sense, appears to require the development of a
common methodology.

The discussion in Chapter XI noted

that methodology is the one unifying element common to all
branches of science.16

The thing which makes an area of

study, such as marketing, a science is the one possible bond
it has in common with the other areas of scientific investi
gation— a scientific methodology.

Until a given area follows

what is generally considered to be a scientific methodology,
it is not classified as a science by knowledgeable outsiders.
Science is determined by its methodology.

Thus the develop

ment of requirements for an accepted epistemology by market
ing scholars is an important step if the field is to become
highly scientific.
a cure-all.

But epistemology must not be considered

A suitable summarization of the situation is

that, for marketing to become highly scientific, it is a
necessary but not sufficient condition that marketing scho
lars develop the requirements for an accepted epistemology.
This summarization statement satisfies the requirements es
tablished in the second subhypothesis but does not overstate
the case.

16Chapter II. pp.

2 6 ^ 32,.
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SUBHYPOTHESIS 3: PROBLEMS WITH EPISTEMOLOGICAL
UNCERTAINTY ADVERSELY AFFECTS DEVELOPMENT OF
SCIENCE IN MARKETING

The third subhypothesis stated that unsettled differ
ences among authorities on epistemology adversely effects
the ability of marketing theorists to develop the field into
a science.

17

These problems are peculiar to epistemology

and occur in addition to other problems presented earlier
in this discussion.

In analyzing this hypothesis, the dis

cussion investigates the acceptance of a priori knowledge,
the problem with induction, and a summarization of how the
three subhypotheses satisfy the primary hypothesis.

The dis

cussion on the acceptance of a priori knowledge includes an
analysis of the positivists' attacks on arithmetic and on
geometry as forms of synthetic a priori knowledge.

The

discussion also includes an analysis of uncertainty surround
ing synthetic a priori knowledge.

The conclusions pertaining

to the problem with induction include a discussion of induc
tion and other explanations as a proof of universal causation.

Acceptance of A Priori Knowledge
The arguments of the logical positivists have had a
significant impact on the acceptance of a priori knowledge

17Chapter I* p. 3.
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as a valid source.

The positivists attacked each category

of supposed synthetic a priori knowledge in an attempt to
prove that it does not exist.

Each category was then deter

mined, to their satisfaction, to be either a case of analytic
a priori knowledge or definitional.
Attacks on Arithmetic:

One important area attacked by

the positivists is arithmetic. ***

According to many of the

proponents of a priorism, arithmetic is a major area of syn
thetic a priori known truths.

Arithmetic statements are

known to be true without reservation to time or space.
Therefore, ten years from now on the other side of the galaxy
seven plus five will still equal twelve.

The positivists

were not satisfied with this explanation, and they contended
that arithmetic statements are tautologies or analytic a
priori statements.

The positivists stated that what is

meant by 7 is the sum of seven individual items, and simil
arly, what is meant by 5 is the sum of five individual items.
Now when these seven and five individual items are grouped
together (added), that grouping is in every way identical to
a grouping of twelve individual items.

The result is the

tautological statement that twelve individual items equals

18Chapter IV,

pp. 92-94.

twelve individual items.
Attacks on the Unreality of Geometry:

Another area of

importance to the a priorist which is also under attack as
a source of synthetic a priori truths is geometry.**^

The

a priorists claim that many of the basic propositions of
Euclid's geometry are known to be true, and yet their truth
is not contained in the definitions or meanings of the word
used to describe them.

Thus, straightness is an understood

quality, not quantity, which is the shortest distance between
two points, among other things.

The definition of the

shortest distance between two points does not necessarily
contain the concept of straightness, all of which appears to
support the a priorist's argument.

However, the positivists

contend that the basic proposition of Euclid's geometry do
not deal with anything which exists in the physical world.
For example, nothing in the, physical world exactly fits the
concept of straightness even though many things come close.
The positivists conclude that something which is not about
physical space is not "about" anything.
Existence of Uncertainty:

Other supposed synthetic a

priori propositions also have come under attack by the

19Chapter IV, pp.

94-96.
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logical positivists.2®

Basically, the positivists use two

definitions of "analytic" in their attacks.

The most

accepted definition is where the negation of a statement
causes a self-contradiction.

The other definition is where

the positivists claim that the rules of language make a
statement analytic.

This latter definition is not accept-

able to a group known as rationalists.

21

This group argues,

somewhat convincingly, that the positivists have not dis
proved the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge.
the debate is still occurring.

But

The positivists argue that

many supposed a priori truths are merely language conventions.
The rationalists counter by accusing the positivists of using
mere convention in their choice of a logic, and the arguments
continue.

The result is uncertainty.

The primary conclusion for the marketing theorist is
that the uncertainty about synthetic a priori knowledge may
hinder development of science in marketing.^2

However, this

hinderence is extremely limited relative to the other prob
lems that must be solved.

Moreover, a sound epistemology

combined with an understanding of the limitations of synthetic

20Chapter IV, pp.

90-93.

21Chapter IV, pp.

98-100.

22Chapter IV, p.

100-101.
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a priori knowledge can be a significant aid to the marketing
theorist.

The Problem with Induction
The existence of a posteriori knowledge is generally
not questioned, but more important, the use that can be made
of it is doubted.

23

The problem lies in the uniformity of

nature and universal causation.

The whole process of sci

entific explanation is based on the search for cause, and
the belief in universal causation is apparently deeply em
bedded in knowledgeable human understanding.

Knowledge is

often equated with the understanding of many causal rela
tionships.

Uniformity in nature and universal causation are

the basis upon which induction rests.

If causation and un

iformity in nature do not exist, induction is invalid and
no inference may be drawn from basic a posteriori knowledge.
Justification for the belief in causation and uniformity in
nature has not been satisfactory according to many skeptics.
Induction as a Proof of Universal Causation;

Any at

tempt to prove the existence of universal causation and
uniformity in nature by induction necessarily involves cir
cular reasoning, since they are the basis for induction.2^

23Chapter IV, p. 101.
2^Chapter IV, pp. 105-107.
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The approach is a tempting solution,

why can't the numerous

examples of cause and effect observed in the past serve as
evidence in favor in induction?

The answer is that such an

attempted proof of induction's validity involves the use of
induction within the proof.

Yet the weight of this evidence

is probably a major factor for human belief in universal
causation.

Still, this approach is not valid because it in

volves circular reasoning.
Other. Explanations of Universal Causation;

If induc

tion is not suitable as a proof, is it possible to satisfy
the strong belief in universal causation at all?

The belief

may be synthetic a priori knowledge or merely habit.2^
Neither of these potential solutions produce happy situations
for the empiricist because his primary tool is then based on
another uncertain source of knowledge or no valid basis at
all.

Again, the conclusion must be uncertainty.
The existence of this problem injects an element of

uncertainty into the efforts of the marketing theorist.

26

Induction is a major tool of the scientist, and it seems he
cannot be sure of its validity.

2^Chapter IV, p. 108.
2<*Chapter IV, pp. 102-?109.

Still, the uncertainty added
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by this problem is far outweighed by the benefits that the
knowledgeable use of epistemology can provide in developing
marketing theory.

The marketing scientist may act as the

pragmatist suggests, but he may also think as the philoso
pher thinks.

Thus, actions may be directed by the practical

problems which constantly face the marketing scientist, but
his thoughts may constantly question the source of specific
knowledge.

A Better Approach for Developing Marketing
Theory
The primary hypothesis of this dissertation states that
a better approach for developing marketing theory can be pro
duced through the study of epistemology.

The discussions on

subhypotheses one and two attempted to establish the potenti
al importance of epistemology in the development of marketing
theory and that a better approach was possible through its
use.

The discussion on sybhypothesis three illustrated that

problems within the nature of epistemology delimit the useful’
ness of this tool but still allow it to be an important aid
for the marketing theorist.

The analysis of these three sub

hypotheses has reasonably established the validity of the
primary hypothesis.
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SELECTING AN EPISTEMOLOGY

The selection of an epistemology suitable for aiding
the development of marketing theory may be a blend of the
two sources of knowledge or an individual selection of either.
These two sources of knowledge are known as a priori and a
posteriori.

An infinite combination of epistemologies may

be generated by applying these two sources in different de
grees.

Therefore, a reasonable approach to providing the

marketing scientist with needed information on epistemology
is to concentrate on the two sources rather than infinite
possible epistemologies.

The following discourse is an in

vestigation of the nature of each source.

Nature of A Priori Knowledge
Basic a priori knowledge was determined to be a product
of the mind without recourse to information obtained through
the human senses.27

While most of those persons who believe

in a priori knowledge also admit the existence of a posteriori
knowledge, they believe that the human mind is capable of
generating knowledge independent of experience.

How the mind

accomplishes this feat is beyond the existing level of

27Chapter III, pp. 59-62.
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knowledge according to the a prior1sts.

However, some
*

characteristics of a priori knowledge were determined.
One characteristic is the two types of a priori know
ledge which are possible.28

These two types are known as

synthetic a priori and analytic a priori knowledge.

As

generally defined, synthetic a priori is the only one which
adds to man's store of knowledge.

Analytic a priori know

ledge is a useful tool for application in logic, but it does
not add to the existing level of knowledge.
Another characteristic concerns the abstract nature of
a priori knowledge.29

A priori knowledge only exists as re

lationships between universals.

Universals are typically

either relationships or generalized properties, and as such,
are abstractions from the physical world. Since a priori
knowledge is a relationship between universals, it is ab
stracted one level further from the physical world than those
universals.

Nature of A Posteriori Knowledge and Induction
The other potential source of knowledge is a posteriori
(after the fact.).30

This knowledge comes directly from

28Chapter III,

pp. 62-6<7‘.

29Chapter III,

pp. 67-73.

30Chapter III,

pp. 73-76.

contact with the physical universe.

Data from the outside

world is passed directly through anytone or combination of
the five human senses (sense-data) and is absorbed by the
mind as knowledge a posteriori.

Virtually no one denies

the existence of basic a posteriori knowledge.

Even the

proponents of a priori knowledge admit that all knowledge
begins with experience.

But the individual particular know

ledge is of limited value unless universals can be derived
from it.
The derivation of universal knowledge from particular
a posteriori knowledge requires the process known as induc
tion.^1

Induction allows an individual to make empirical

generalizations.

Ah empirical generalization occurs when

many individual objects or events are observed to have the
same property, and that property is then said to apply to
all similar objects or events.
After satisfying the primary hypothesis, the one re
maining task of importance in this dissertation is to urge
the application of these conclusions.

Suggestions on how

this application may be accomplished are covered in the fol
lowing section.

31

Chapter III, pp. 76-81.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR APPLICATION OF CONCLUSIONS

The value of epistemology to the development of
marketing theory can not be realized until marketing scholars
establish its guidelines of acceptability.

To accomplish

this feat, considerable debate is likely to be necessary.
Publication of the basic facts in texts and analysis of
favored approaches in prominent periodicals is suggested as
an initial phase in the development of understanding among
marketing scholars.

As this information becomes more popular,

its injection into the graduate level theory courses in uni
versities may boost interest as well as understanding.

Class

room discussion of epistemology and methodology would be a
major step forward in establishing understanding of these
areas.

Considering the early stage of marketing evolvement

toward a science, a good case may be made for concentrating
efforts in theory courses toward the area of methodology.
Once methodology is better understood and more readily
discussed among marketing scholars, the author suggests that
every article and text which deals with marketing theory be
developed to also contain a statement on methodology used.
Specifically, a statement on the sources of knowledge used
for each individual explanation allows the reader to judge

the total value of the theory.

Sometimes the source of

knowledge is obvious from the description of an empirical
test, but in a science dealing with human action, this
situation is often not the case.

If self-evident fact or

intuitive insight is a source of knowledge for a particular
explanation, that fact may be far from obvious.

If market

ing theorists wish the field to be considered a science by
knowledgeable persons outside the area, they must pattern
their writings around sound methodology and clearly identify
the methodology they have used.
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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE STUDY

INSTRUCTIONS:
This questionnaire is necessary to develop the hypo
thesis for a doctoral dissertation. Your help and coopera
tion in filling out and returning the questionnaire is great
ly appreciated.
Your answers are to be kept anonymous, and only aggre
gate figures will be used. Thus, there is no need to sign
any part of the questionnaire. However,..if you desire a
summary copy of the results just send your name and address
in a separate letter.
Please answer all the questions that you can without
references. Give your first reaction and do not change the
answer once the decision is made. Do not be concerned if
you cannot answer all the questions, but return the question
naire as complete as possible.
Thank you again for your cooperation.
I.

Historical Sketch
1. What is your age._______________
2. Please identify the type of institution in which you
teach.
_______ Public (State or Municipal)
_______ Non-Public
3. What is your academic rank?
_______ Instructor
_______ Assistant Professor
_______ Associate Professor
Professor
_______ Other (Please specify)________________________
4. How many years (approximately) have you been employed
as a full-time teacher?________
5. Which of the following represents your highest academ
ic standing?
______ Bachelors
Masters
A ll but dissertation toward doctorate
_______ Doctorate
Other (Please specify)_________________ _______
6 . From what institution did you attain your highest
.academic standing?
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7.
8.

II.

What was your major?
what two areas in marketing interest you the most?

Have you ever had formal (in the classroom) in-depth
study of the role of methodology in developing theory
Yes
No

III.

Have you ever informally (outside the Classroom) studoed the philosophical viewpoints on methodology?
Yes
No

IV.

Where would you place the body of marketing thought,
as it exists today, on the following continuum? Please
answer by placing an X somewhere along the continuum.

/

/

0%

/
20%

Non-Theoretical
V.

/

/

/
40%

/

/
60%

/

/

/

80%

100%

Theoretical

Please read the following passage and answer the ques
tion that applies to it.
"In the sciences of human action we comprehend pheno
mena from within. Because we are human beings, we
are in a position to grasp the meaning of human action.
It is this comprehension of meaning that enables us to
formulate the general principles by means of which we
explain the phenomena of action."
Please place a check by one of the following items that
you feel best represents the fundamental method (s) of
developing theory as implied by the above statement.
__________ intuitive research
__________ logic
__________ empirical research
__________ self-evident truth or fact
__________ experience
none of these to a significant degree
__________ all of these
________ Methodology and theory are not appropriate
topics for the field of; marketing.
__________ don't know
__________ other (Please specify)______________________
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VI.

Please read the following message and answer the
question that applies to it.
nIf an instance in which the phenomenon under in
vestigation occurs, and an instance in which it
does not occur, have every circumstance in common
save one, that one occurring only in the former;
the circumstance in which alone the two instances
differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indis
pensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon."
Please place a check by one of the following items
that you feel best represents the fundamental method(s)
of developing theory as implied by the above state
ment.
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________

intuitive insight
logic
empirical research
self-evident truth or fact
experience
non of these to a significant degree
all of these
Methodology and theory are not appropri
ate topics for the field of marketing.
___________ don't know
___________ other (Please specify)___________________
VII.

Please rate the following in importance for the de
velopment of marketing theory.
(1 most important,
2, 3, 4, 5)
___________ intuitive insight
___________ logic
___________ empirical research
___________ self-evident truth or fact
___________ experience
___________ Methodology and theory are not appropriate
topics for the field of marketing.
______ don't know

VIII.

Please read the following passage and answer the ques
tion that applies to it.
For many thousands of years man has observed
rise f r o m -9•to 15 hours after setting in the
From this knowledge only, it is predicted by
that the sun will rise tomorrow from 9. to 15

the sun
evening.
someone
hours
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after setting in the evening. However, another
party objects to this prediction.
Please place a check by the following statement(s)
that you feel are possible legitimate philosophically
based objections to this prediction.
________ Mere historical data does not allow meaningful
extrapolation into the future.
________ No hypothesis can be totally verified through
empiricism.
The prediction should be probabilistic.
________ The prediction is a case of pure deductive
reasoning.
________ Ultimate truths are the only valid criteria
for truth.
________ The use of logic requires the application of
other than empirical sources of information.
________ The source of all knowledge is the obviously
true, constructs of the mind.
________ The above approach is not pragmatic.
IX. Please read the following hypothetical situation and ans
wer the questions that apply to it. This situation is
in no way presented as factual or indicative of anyone's
thought processes.
SITUATION: Suppose you have been reading about
DNA, the primary chemical that makes up man's
brain. You have also been reading about the new
palm size chemical computers under development.
The thought occurs to you that maybe man's brain
is nothing more than a complex chemical computer.
Now suppose you reason that if man's brain is
nothing more than a computer, and if the process
and all of the inputs were known, man would really
be a mechanistic being capable of being predicted
with 100% accuracy. Realizing the importance to
marketing, suppose you personally set for yourself
the goal of finding out the truth or falsity of this
thought.
1.

Please briefly list the steps you see as necessary
to determine the answer. There may be more or less
than 10 steps. Use the back of the page if neces
sary.
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1.

6.

2.
7.
3 ._____________________ 8._________
4 ._____________ ;_______
9._________
5 ._____________________ 10._________
What would you call this approach?
2. If you feel there is another suitable approach,
please briefly list the things you would do under it,
1
6
2 .___________________
7.______________________
3.
8.______________________
4.
9>_______________________
5.
10.
What would you call this approach?________________
3. If you feel there are still other approaches, what
would you call them?

.

.
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C ollege o f Business A dm in istra tio n

October 18, 1968
Dear Professor:
Is marketing a science? Is it an art? Can it become highly
scientific? Should it attempt to become more scientific?
The assessment of your opinion on these questions can be
useful in analyzing the present and future role of marketing
development.
There is a great need for research in the areas of marketing
methodology and marketing theory.
The attached questionnaire
will provide part of the background information for a doctor
al dissertation into these areas. Won't you help increase
the amount and quality of information available? You can do
so by completing the attached questionnaire promptly and
sending it to me in the addressed, stamped envelope provided.
Only composite figures will be used for results and YOUR
RESPONSE WILL BE KEPT ANONYMOUS.
In an effort to keep
individual returns confidential, you are requested not to
sign the questionnaire.
If you would like to have a copy
of my results just send your name and address in a separate
letter or card.
You have been selected to receive this questionnaire because
of your academic position and your interest in marketing.
Thank you for your effort and interest in completing it.
Sincerely,

Donald P . Robin
Graduate Assistant in Marketing
Shh
Enclosure
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